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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with pre-emptive rights. These are 
designed to keep control of companies in existing hands by 
restricting the transfer of shares to their present members. 
Directors corrunonly have various powers to refuse registration 
of a transfer. Articles 23 - 25 of Table A (l) provide a limited 
right to refuse registration of a transfer. Most private companies 
have provisions in their articles that empower the directors to 
refuse a transfer either without reason or for the reason stated. (
2 ) 
Pre-emptive rights provide a greater degree of regulation by 
restricting the right of transfer <and sale) to other ~embers of 
the company. Although pre-emptive rights articles may differ 
i n wording, it will usua lly be possible to distinguish the 
following features:-
(1) A prohibition on transf e r to non-members while any other 
member is will ing to purchase the shares. 
(2) A shareholder will be require d to give notice to the company 
of his desire to s e l l or transfer the shares. 
(3) A procedure by which the shares are to be offered to the 
other shareholders. 
(4) Compulsory transfer of the shares if a purchaser is found. 
(5) A method to determine the value of the shares in the case of 
disagreement. 
(1) See third schedule to Companies Act 1955 
(2) In Britain section 28 (1) (a) of the Companies Act requires 
private companies to have restrictions on transfers in their 
articles 
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(6) A power given to some named officer to execute a transfer 
if the vendor/shareholder makes default in doing so. 
(7) Permission for the shareholder to sell his shares to 
outsiders if no other shareholder wishes to purchase them. 
This summary follows closely the standard form pre-emptive 
rights article set out in Dale & Sclater. (l) Comparison may be 
made with the pre-emptive rights article considered in Lyle & 
Scott v Scott's Trustees. (2 ) This case will receive detailed 
attention in this paper. An abbreviated version of the latter 
article is as follows:-
" ... no registered shareholder of more than one per centum 
of the issued ordinary share capital of the company shall, 
without the consent of the directors, be entitled to 
transfer any ordinary share for a nominal consideration 
or by way of security and no transfer of ordinary shares 
by such a shareholder shall take place for an onerous 
consideration so long as any other ordinary shareholder 
is willing to purchase the same at a price which shall be 
ascertained by agreement between the intending transferor 
and the directors and, failing agreement, at a price to be 
fixed by the auditor of the company ... Any such 
ordinary shareholder who is desirous of transferring his 
ordinary shares shall inform the secretary in writing of 
the number of ordinary shares which he desires to transfer 
A pre-emptive rights article as above should be distinguished 
from the type of article that was under consideration in 
Gold v Penny. (3 ) The articles here had the format of the usual 
( 1) Private Companies in New Zealand: (1968) p.87-88 See 
Appendix I 
(2) (1959) A.C. 763 A full version of the article is set out 
in Appendix I post. 
II 
(3) (1960) N.Z.L.R. 1032; cf. the precedent in Anderson & Dalglish: 
"The Law Relating to Companies in New Zealand" (2nd Ed.) 
1957, p.810,811. 
pre-emptive rights article but the shareholders had no real 
right of pre-emption. The shares were to be sold to members of 
the company OR anyone else whom the directors approved. (l) 
It is now proposed to examine some aspects of pre-emptive 
rights articles in more detail. 
(1) The article is set out in Appendix II 
PART II 
THE MEANING OF "DESIROUS OF TRANSFERRING" 
AND "DESIROUS OF SELLING" AS USED IN 
PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARTICLES 
Some pre-emptive rights articles, as in Lyle & Scott Ltd.v 
Scott's Trustees(l) provide that when a shareholder is 'desirous 
of transferring' his shares, he must inform the company. In 
other articles, e.g. Gold v Penny( 2 ) the equivalent wording is 
'desirous of selling'. The meaning of each of these expressions 
will be considered in turn. 
A. "DESIROUS OF TRANSFERRING" 
As has already been mentioned, in Lyle & Scott Ltd. v Scott's 
Trustees( 3 ) the pre-emptive rights clause provided (inter alia) 
that any ordinary shareholder -
"who is desirous of transferring his ordinary shares shall 
inform the secretary in writing of the number of ordinary 
shares which he desires to transfer." 
The respondents in this appeal accepted an offer to purchase 
their shares in the appellant company. The offer was made 
through a firm of solicitors acting for an undisclosed principal 
who later turned out to be Mr. Hugh Fraser, a millionaire 
businessman. The offer had become unconditional upon the 
acceptance of 75% of the ordinary shares then in issue. The 
vendors agreed to deliver forms of proxy in favour of the 
purchaser and authorise him to use them. They were further 
required to deliver up their share certificates in respect of 
their shares in the company which they had agreed to sell and 
to sign the relative transfers when called upon to do so in 
exchange for the price. The purchase price was, in fact, handed 
over in exchange for the share certificates and completed forms 
of proxy were delivered. However, at Fraser's request, no void 
or defective transfers were actually delivered at this stage. 
(1) (1959) A.C. 763 
(2) (1960) N.Z.L.R. 1032 
(3) (1959) A.C. 763 
Thereupon, the company initiated an action to seek a 
declaration that the respondents were, in fact, 'desirous of 
transferring' the shares and that they were bound to inform the 
secretary of the company of this fact in accordance with the 
articles. A further order was sought to compel the respondents 
to inform the secretary accordingly. 
Both the Lord Ordinary and the First Division of the Court 
of Session held that although a breach of the articles had 
occurred by the shareholders entering into the agreement with 
Fraser, the Company must fail to obtain its remedy as the 
shareholders had not done an overt act. The giving of notice 
to the company could be such an act. (l) 
The House of Lords took a different view. Their Lordships 
held that a person who has agreed to sell his shares (and has 
received the purchase price) must be deemed to be 'desirous of 
transferring' his shares and, consequently, was bound to 
implement the articles by informing the secretary of the number 
of shares to be sold. The respondents were further ordered, 
the agreement still standing, to inform the secretary accordingly. 
The basic argument of the respondents was that the 'transfer' 
and 'transferring' in the last part of the article only applied 
to a complete transfer by acceptance of deeds of transfer. 
Consequently, it was argued that as long as one is not desirous 
of having a transfer registered a person is entitled to agree to 
sell his shares without the article coming into operation. 
Viscount Simonds did not wish to be categorical about the 
meaning of 'transfer'. However, in a passage that deserves to 
be quoted in full he gave his reasons for holding that the appeal 
must succeed:-
"For since it is the admitted fact that they entered into 
the agreement for sale of their shares and have received 
(1) See: Rice: "The Effectiveness of a Pre-emptive Rights Clause 
in a Company's Articles" (1959) 23 Conveyancer & Property 
Lawyer, 42 
and retain the price, it follows that, whether or not they have 
yet done all that they ought as vendors to do, they hold the 
shares as trustees for the purchaser. They are bound to do 
everything that in them lies to perfect the title of the 
purchaser. They cannot compel the company to register him as 
the holder of the shares, but everything else they must do, and 
it is straining credulity too far to suppose that everything 
else would not already have been done, if it had not been hoped 
to gain some tactical advantage by delay. In my opinion, it is 
not open to a shareholder, who has agreed to do a certain thing 
and is bound to do it, to deny that he is desirous of doing it. 
I wish to make it quite clear, for it goes to the root of thd 
matter, that I regard Scott's trustees as desirous of transferring 
their ordinary shares unless and until their agreement with 
Mr. Fraser has been abrogated. Of this at least one acid test 
would be the return by them of the price they have received." (l) 
Later on Viscount Simonds came back to the same point when he said:-
"What he (the shareholder) cannot be permitted to do is to 
adhere to his contract and in the same breath assert that he 
does not desire to transfer his shares. It may well be that 
he thus places himself in a position of disadvantage vis-a-vis 
the purchaser with whom he has contracted. But it cannot be 
denied that he has done so with his eyes open."( 2 ) 
One matter should be mentioned in connection with the first 
passage quoted above. Viscount Simonds bases his judgrnent on the 
finding that the respondents must be 'desirous of transferring' 
when they become trustees for the purchasers upon them entering 
into the agreement for sale and purchase. At present it is not 
altogether clear whether any equitable interest can pass if a contract 
is entered into in defiance of such registration provisions in the 
(1) ibid 774 
(2) ibid 775-776 
articles. There is even some authority for the view that such 
an agreement is a nullity. Both these areas are dealt with later 
in this paper, (l) but for present purposes it will suffice to examine 
the possibility of a finding that the respondents are 'desirous of 
transferring' if it should be held that either no equitable interests 
arise under such a contract and/or the contract is a nullity. 
In the first situation, the vendor/shareholder is still 
presumably bound to do everything to perfect the title of the 
purchaser while the contract is still in existence. If the writer's 
supposition is correct, then it is submitted that the reason for 
finding that a vendor is desirous of transferring must remain. The 
reason for preventing a person denying that he is 'desirous of 
transferring' will be especially strong if he exhibits an intention 
to retain the purchase price which may have changed hands. As 
Viscount Simonds pointed out( 2 ) a shareholder may abandon his 
desire by terminating the existence of the overt act signifying 
the existence of the desire. The example he gave was the abrogation 
of the contract of sale and purchase; the "acid test" would be the 
return of the purchase price. (J) 
Even assuming that the contract is a nullity, it still may be 
possible to find grounds for holding that a shareholder must be 
deemed to be desirous of transferring. It was assumed in Lyle & 
Scott v Scott's Trustees that the vendor/shareholder could annul the 
contract. (4 ) Presumably the purchaser could also repudiate the 
agreement. If, however, the parties act on the assumption that the 
agreement is still in existence and show no sign of repudiating it, 
the vendor could be said to be 'desirous of transferring' because 
of the inconsistency of the parties adherence to the purported 
agreement with the vendor's denial of his intention to divest himself 
of his shares. As a practical matter a purchaser would be unlikely 
to continue an arrangement that can never achieve any legal effect. 
If, in such a case, he was still anxious to obtain control or a voice 
in a company, he would seek some other method of obtaining this result. 
(1) See Part IV 
( 2) ibid 774-775. See also@ 780 per Lord Reid; 786 per Lord Keith 
( 3) ibid 7 74 
articles. There is even some authority for the view that such 
an agreement is a nullity. Both these areas are dealt with later 
in this paper, (l) but for present purposes it will suffice to e x amine 
the possibility of a finding that the respondents are 'desirous of 
tran s ferring' if it should be held that either no equitable interests 
arise under such a contract and/or the contract is a nullity. 
In the first situation, the vendor/shareholder is still 
pre sumably bound to do everything to perfect the title of the 
purchaser while the contract is still in existence. If the writer's 
supposition is correct, then it is submitted that the reason for 
finding that a vendor is desirous of transferring must remain. The 
reason for preventing a person denying that he is 'desirous of 
transferring' will be especially strong if he exhibits an intention 
to retain the purchase price which may have changed hands. As 
Viscount Simonds pointed out(
2 ) a shareholder may abandon his 
desi r e by terminating the existence of the overt act signifying 
the e x istence of the de sire . The e xample he gave was the abrogation 
of t he contract of s a l e and purchase; the "acid test" would be the 
return ·of the purchas e price . <3 ) 
Eve n assuming that the contract is a nullity, it still may be 
poss ible to find grounds for holding that a shareholder must be 
deemed to be desirous of transferring. It was assumed in Lyle & 
Scott v Scott's Trustees that the vendor/shareholder could annul the 
contract. (4 ) Presumably the purchaser could also repudiate the 
agreement. If, however, the parties act on the assumption that the 
ag r e ement is still in existence and show no sign of repudiating it, 
the vendor could be said to be 'desirous of transferring' because 
of the inconsistency of the parties adherence to the purported 
agreement with the vendor's denial of his intention to divest himself 
of his shares. As a practical matter a purchaser would be unlikely 
to continue an arrange ment that can never achieve any legal effect. 
If , in such a case , he was still anxious to obtain control or a voice 
in a company, he would seek some other method of obtaining this result. 
(1 ) See Part IV 
(2 ) ibid 774-775. Se e also@ 780 per Lord Reid; 786 per Lord Keith 
(3 ) ibid 774 
(4 ) See Steve n s on v Wilson (1907) S.C. 445@ 455 p e r Lord President. 
This ground f or repudiation was doubted by Tamberlin in (1960) 
3 Sydney Law Review, 560 @ 564-565 
Lord Tucker delivered a brief but similar judgment to that of 
viscount Simonds. His Lordship pointed out the existence of the 
agreement for sale and purchase of the shares and continued:-
"They thereby bound themselves to take every step which is 
required from the holder of a share who desires to transfer 
to another the legal and equitable title to his share. They 
have received from Mr. Fraser the agreed purchase price and the 
the contract still subsists. By so doing they have, in my 
view, beyond question taken an overt act signifying their 
desire to transfer their shares within the meaning of 
article 9 of the articles of association of Lyle & Scott Ltd."(l) 
The speech of Lord Reid dealt specifically with the meaning of 
the words "transferring" and "transfer" in the relevant parts of the 
pre-emptive rights article under consideration. He rejected the 
limited meaning that was sought to be given to the words by the 
respondents. (2 ) He held that "tranfer" should not be taken to be 
limited to the actual process of registration of an interest of transfer:-
"Transferring a share involves a series of steps, first an 
agreement to sell, then the execution of a deed of transfer 
and finally the registration of the transfer. The word 
transfer can mean the whole of those steps. Moreover, the 
ordinary meaning of "transfer" is simply to hand over or part 
with something, and a shareholder who agrees to sell is 
parting with something." (3 ) 
Lord Reid looked at the context in which the word "transfer" 
was used:-
"I have already referred to the obvious purpose of article 9; 
to give the other shareholders an option to purchase shares 
(1) ibid 782 
(2) ibid 778 
(3) ibid 778 
which any shareholder desires to part with. To be effective 
it must come into operation before that shareholder agrees to 
sell to anyone else, and the last part of the article clearly 
contemplates this." ( l) 
Lord Reid thus takes a different approach to Lord Simonds. 
The latter did not express a concluded opinion upon the meaning 
of the word "transfer". He was clearly of the view that in any 
circumstances the present transaction would infringe the pre-emptive 
rights article - the vendors were committed to a course that would 
lead ultimately to the registration of a transfer. The fact that 
the parties purposely did not execute a transfer did not alter the 
situation. While Lord Reid finds alternative grounds for his 
judgrnent he would also agree with this conclusion:-
"But in my judgment, a person who has agreed to sell with a 
view to a transfer at some future date cannot be heard to 
say that he is not desirous of transferring the shares merely 
because it suits him and the purchaser to delay execution and 
presentation of the transfers. 11 ( 2 ) 
The purpose of the article in Lord Reid's opinion is to give 
other shareholders an option to purchase the shares concerned. While 
his Lordship did not consider the point it would seem that an option 
to purchase would in his view come within the contemplation of the 
article. The shareholding giving the option is 'parting' with 
something. His course of action will in certain circumstances lead 
to a transfer of shares. 
into a different class. 
A contract of first refusal appears to fall 
The shareholder has not obliged himself to 
transfer, sell or part with his shares. 
Lord Keith also specifically considered the question of the 
correct meaning of "transfer" within the last part of the pre-emptive 
(1) ibid 778 
(2) ibid 779 
rights article. He thought that it was used in a broad sense of 
"dispose of or sell''. He then went on to express the opinion that 
e ven if transfer was to be given a restrictive meaning it did not 
f ollow that a shareholder does not express his desire until the 
instrument of transfer is presented for registration. (l) Here the 
respondents had done everything but execute a formal instrument of 
transfer. They had even executed proxies in favour of the purchasers' 
solicitors. He went on:-
"I am clear that there is here a clear breach of the positive 
part of the article requiring an intending transferor to inform 
the secretary in writing of the number of shares he wishes to 
transfer and an invasion of the rights of the shareholders under 
the article Standing a completed and unrepudiated contract 
of sale and acceptance of the purchase money the defenders 
cannot be heard to say that they are not desirous to transfer 
their shares because they chhose for some reason or other to 
hold up completion of the document of transfer or wish to sell 
only to a particular person." ( 2) 
This case is an interesting example of judicial concern to find 
a solution to remedy what would otherwise be an unfair result. ( 3 ) 
The Scottish Courts were concerned that the granting of relief 
t o the company would be, in effect, to order a compulsory sale 
t he respondents shares. ( 4 ) While they had held that there was 




of Lords were not prepared to give such a restrictive interpretation 
t o the article. While the giving of notice would be a clear method 
of showing that one was desirous of transferring it was not the only 
(1 ) ibid 785 
(2) ibid 786 
(3) See casenote by Tarnberlin in 1960 3 Sydney Law Review, 560@ 563 
(4) See (1959) A.C. 763@ 779 per Lord Reid 
(5) See 1958 S.C. 230@ 244 per Lord President; see also Lord Sorn 
@ 250. 
method by which a desire to transfer shares could be established. (l) 
Viscount Simonds said:-
"I cannot, for instance, accept the view of the Lord President 
that there has been no overt act which could enable the 
company to require the defenders to follow out the procedure 
in the article, nor do I find it easy to reconcile this part 
of his judgment with his decision that Scott's Trustees had 
infringed the article by transferring or purporting to transfer 
their shares to Mr. Fraser. What more conspicuous overt act, 
evincing the desire to transfer, could there be than this?" 
( 2) 
Lord Reid responded in a similar manner to the argument that 
the desire to transfer had not been evinced by any overt act:-
"But if the respondents' admitted actions were in breach of 
their obligations, I do not see that it matters whether or 
in what sense they were "overt". I would not hold a desire 
to transfer proved by some equivocal words or acts. But 
here it is impossible that the respondents could have done 
what they did unless they desired to transfer: there is no 
suggestion of any other reason why they should have contracted 
with Mr. Fraser." (3 ) 
The relief granted in the House of Lords made it clear that the 
respondents were only obliged to give notice to the secretary of the 
company if the agreement still stood. However, their Lordships were 
not prepared to interpret the pre-emptive rights article in such a 
way that the respondents were the sole arbiters of whether they were 
desirous of transferring their shares. 
(1) See (1960) 3 Sydney Law Review@ 563 
(2) ibid 775 
(3) ibid 779 
This is clearly expressed in the judgment of Lord Reid. It 
had been argued that the pre-emptive rights article was a means of 
selling shares and not a provision compelling transfer. He gave 
qualified acceptance to this proposition. It was true that no action 
could be taken against the person who merely said that he wished 
to sell his shares or did something which exhibited this intention. 
such behaviour without more was beyond the purview of the court. 
It was, however, different if what is done amounts to a breach of 
the shareholders obligations under an article:-
"Unless some action can then be taken to assert the other 
shareholders' rights under the article there is a wrong 
without a remedy."(l) 
Lord Keith of Avonholm was equally candid in the reasons for 
interpreting the article so as to provide the appellants with a 
remedy here. He rejected the view taken by the Lord Ordinary of 
the First Division of the Court of Session that it is for the 
respondents alone to decide whether they would set the machinery 
in motion under Article 9 by informing the company secretary 
of their intention to sell:-
"There must reside in the courts some power to enforce 
observance of the article, unless the rights of the 
shareholders are to be defeated, and the appropriate 
step at this stage, in my Gpinion, is to ordain the 
defenders to give notice to the secretary of their desire 
to transfer the number of shares which they have 
contracted to sell to their purchaser. 11 ( 2 ) 
(1) ibid 779 
(2) ibid 786 
In the result, the remedy given avoided the respondents being 
bound to sell their shares should they decide to rescind their 
contract. 
Lyle & Scott Ltd. v Scott's Trustees was discussed by the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in Gold v Penny(l) which was decided 
in the following year. The so called pre-emptive rights article 
here was considerably different from that considered in the former 
case. (2 ) As Gresson P. said in the Court of Appeal, the 'rights 
of pre-emption' conferred by the article in question here did not 
give a right of first refusal to the shareholders (or anyone else) 
and thus the term was a misnomer. (3 ) There were a number of 
distinguishing features in this case (4 ) but the Court of Appeal 
did not cast doubt upon the correctness of the decision of the 
House of Lords in Lyle & Scott Ltd. v Scott's Trustees. 
(1) (1960) N.Z.L.R. 1032 
(2) see Appendix II 
(3) see (1960) N.Z.L.R. 1032; 1046. Also see 1058 per Cleary & 
Hutchison J.J. 
(4) ibid 1061 per Cleary and Hutchison J.J. 
B, "DESIROUS OF SELLING" 
Some articles provide for a transfer notice to be given to a 
company whenever a shareholder is 'desirous of selling'. In Lyle & 
Scott Ltd. v Scott's Trustees both Lord Reid and Lord Keith of 
Avonholm were of the opinion that the word transfer as used in the 
pre-emptive rights article discussed in that case was used in the 
sense of "to dispose of or sell" or "to hand over or part with 
• II ( 1 ) 11 • • 1 something . Clearly an agreement to se is an unequivoca 
( 2 ) 
act showing a desire to sell and a desire to transfer. 
The question arises as to what other conduct would be sufficient 
to exhibit a desire to sell. 
Lord Reid said:-
In Lyle & Scott Ltd. v Scott's Trustees 
"I would not hold a desire to transfer proved by some 
( 3 ) 
equivocal words or acts." 
Lord Reid said that it was impossible in that case that the 
respondents could have done what they did unless they desired to 
transfer their shares. Later he says:-
"No action can be taken against a shareholder who merely says 
that he wishes to sell or does somethings which shows that 
that is bis intention. But, when he goes further and does 
something which is a breach of his obligations under the 
article, the position appears to me to be quite different." 
( 4) 
Lord Reid would, therefore, distinguish between an unequivocal 
act showing that the shareholder is 'desirous of transferring' and 
something short of this. The same principle applies (mutatis 
mutandis) to the sufficiency of a desire to sell. While the desire 
of selling must be established by unequivocal acts, Lord Reid did 
not consider it mattered whether the acts were overt or not. 
( 5 ) 
(1) (1959) A.C. 763 @ 785 per Lord Keith 
( 2 ) ibid 775 per Viscount Simonds 
( 3 ) ibid 779 
( 4) idem 
( 5) ibid 779 
The writer finds it difficult to visualise the exact nature 
of the acts which could be unequivocal unless embodied in a sale and 
purchase agreement. It is submitted that negotiations for the purchase 
of shares without more would not be sufficient. An option to purchase 
shares is a difficult problem. (l) No sale is achieved until the option 
is exercised. If the person giving an option is regarded as being 
'desirous of selling' the company or shareholders could obtain the 
same remedy as the company in Lyle & Scott v Scott's Trustees obtained. 
The person giving the option would be bound to set the procedure under 
the pre-emptive rights article in motion in the event of the continued 
existence of the option. There does not appear to be any injustice 
involved in compelling the vendor shareholder to comply with the 
articles without waiting for an acceptance of the option by the 
proposed purchaser. By giving an option the shareholder has shown the 
intention to sell. In the writer's opinion the fact that the 
substantive contract may never eventuate should not be treated as a 
relevant consideration. 
The discussion so far concerning options to purchase shares has 
proceeded upon the assumption that the option has been given for 
consideration or is by deed. An option given without consideration 
and which is not by deed cannot be enforced. It can be withdrawn with 
impunity at any time. Whether the courts would treat this as showing 
an unequivocal desire to sell shares is open to doubt. The vendor 
is not bound to take all steps to complete the contract. In Lyle & 
Scott Ltd. v Scott's Trustees Lord Simonds & Lord Tucker in particular 
relied upon the fact that the vendors in that case were bound to do 
everything to complete the contract and perfect the title of the 
purchaser. This is not the situation here. 
(1) See Halsbury: Laws of England 4th Ed. Vol.9 Para. 235 
In the present circumstances the shareholder would not be 
bound to carry out his contract. No consideration has passed. He may 
i ntend to do so and there would no doubt be evidence of his acts 
exhibiting this intention. However, in the absence of a binding 
contract Lyle & Scott Ltd. v Scott's Trustees is distinguishable 
i n this regard. It is submitted that the continued existence of an 
unenforceable option should not result in a shareholder being 
c ompelled to comply with the pre-emptive rights articles. While in 
Lyle & Scott Ltd. v Scott's Trustees there was an obvious 
i nconsistency between the respondents' claim that they were not 
' desirous of selling' and the continued existence of an executed 
contract, in the present situation the shareholder has not given 
a ny consideration. 
The writer finds support in this conclusion in an article in the 
Sydney Law Re view, {l) where the problem of what acts will 
unequivocably indicate an intention to sell is discussed. 
"In solving such a problem it may be that the courts would 
have to draw a finer distinction between the legal factum 
which would bring the article into operation and the 
mere abstract "wishing" or "intending" to sell which would 
not. 11 ( 2 ) 
One other type of arrangement that is clearly outside the 
contemplation of the pre-emptive rights article is a contract of 
first refusal. (3 ) The view has already been expressed that such a 
contract would not exhibit a desire to transfer even upon Lord Reid's 
understanding of the term. The same reasoning is applicable here. 
Such a contract does not exhibit any present desire to sell. It 
simply binds a person to sell to a particular person should he ever 
wish to sell. 
(1) (1960) 3 Sydney Law Review 560@ 564 
(2) ibid 564 
(3) See Halsbury: 4th Ed. Val 9 Para. 236 
PART III 
REVOCATION OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO 
SELL AND/OR TRANSFER SHARES 
In the previous part of this-paper, it has been mentioned 
that while the respondents in Lyle & Scott v Scott's Trustees (l) 
were held to be desirous of transferring their shares and thus 
could be compelled to give the requisite notice to the company, 
they were entitled to say that they were no longer desirous of 
selling their shares if they annulled their contract with Fraser. 
This part of the paper is concerned with the question whether 
the notice to the company can be revoked once it has been given. 
This did not arise directly for decision in Lyle & Scott v Scott's 
Trustees but it was the subject of comment by some of their 
Lordships . However, reference should first be made to the earlier 
S · f s · w· <2 ) d s w·1 <3 ) cottish cases o mith v ilson an tevenson v i son. 
Both these cases arose out of the same complex situation. Wilson 
was a trustee in sequestration and advertised for sale some shares 
in J.M. Smith Ltd. As appears from the later case, Stevenson 
agreed to buy the shares. One of the conditions upon which the 
contract was founded was that the company did not have to accept 
any transferee. 
The articles provided that any holder of ordinary shares who 
wished to sell them had to offer them to the company at the price 
at which he wished to sell and the company had to take them at 
that price or intimate the offer to other shareholders who could 
lodge offers within fourteen days. 
Wilson offered the shares to the company before taking any 
further steps pursuant to his conditional contract with Stevenson. 
He then withdrew his offer before any one of the shareholders had 
written to the company offering to purchase the shares. The Lord 
(1) (1959) A.C. 763 
(2) 1901 9 S.L.T. 137 
(3) 1907 s.c. 445 
Justice Clerk(l) held that Wilson was entitled to withdraw his 
offer at any time before it was accepted. He further pointed out 
that if the defendent attempted to effect the sale of the shares 
to Stevenson without complying with the articles, the company 
could refuse to register the transfer. 
Stevenson did not pay the price for the shares. <
2 ) Wilson 
sued for payment and obtained an order for payment. The transfers 
were executed but the company refused to register them. Stevenson 
then brought the second reported action. The company had refused 
to pay dividends on the shares to Stevenson and Wilson had 
refused to receive them and pay them to Stevenson. 
The First Division of the Court of Session upheld the judgement 
as 
of the Lord Ordinary to the effect that so long/Wilson did not annul 
the bargain by returning the purchase price, he must fulfil his 
obligations as trustee. The Lord President said:-
"When there is a stipulation in the articles of the company 
which allows the directors of the company to refuse at their 
own hand any particular transferee, then A and B, who are 
contracting, do so with their eyes open, and knowing that it 
may be the case that B will not be accepted as transferee. 
It still becomes the duty of B, if he cannot get the defenders 
to register him, to find a transferee whom the defenders will 
register in order to free A, and I think, if he is entirely 
unable to do that, A can bring the bargain to an end. But I 
think he could only do so in the ordinary way by annulling the 
bargain - that is, giving the money he had got from Band 
b 
. . . . (3)1! 
ringing matters to their entirety. 
In Lyle & Scott v Scott's Trustees ( 4 ) Lord Reid used the cases 
just mentioned to support the propositions that firstly any notice 
that was to be given by the respondents was not irrevocable and 
(1) 1901 9 S.L.T. 137 
(2) See 1907 S.C. 445, 454 
(3) ibid 455 
(4) (1959) A.C. 763 
. b . . h M F (l) H secondly they could annul their argains wit r. raser. e 
rejected an interpretation of the pre-emptive rights article that 
would prevent the respondents from avoiding a compulsory sale 
of their shares:-
"That article requires a notice to be given by any 
shareholder who desires to sell his shares, but it does 
not make such a notice irrevocable. No doubt it becomes 
irrevocable when the procedure following on it results in 
a contract between the shareholder giving the notice and 
another shareholder who has made an offer for the shares 
.... But until that stage is reached it appears to me that it 
is open to the shareholder who gives the notice to withdraw 
it ... " <2 ) 
Viscount Simonds said that he did not dissent from the view 
d · s · w·1 c3 ) h · b expresse in mith v i son tat notice to a company may e 
"timeously" withdrawn. ( 4 ) Lord Keith also considered Smith v 
· <5 ) w· <5 ) · b h · Wilson and Stevenson v ilson. He did not dou t t eir 
correctness but pointed out that the specific questions arising 
in the present case were not dealt with in thos cases. 
In Beynon v Acme Engineering Limited et al 
( 7 ) 
a shareholder 
gave notice of his intention to sell his shares to a company in 
accordance with the particular pre-emptive rights article 
concerned . The next day he withdrew his notice. The company 
solicitors took tae view that the notice was irrevocable. The 
board of directors continued to act in accordance with the 
pre-emptive rights articles and authorised one of its members to 
execute the transfer. The plaintiff thereupon sought an injunction 
to restrain the company and the members of its board from further 
dealing with his shares. 
( 1) ibid 781 
( 2) ibid 780 
( 3 ) 1901 9 S.L.T. 137 
( 4 ) (1959) A.C. 7 63 @ 775 
( 5 ) 1901 9 S.L.T. 137 
( 6) 1907 s.c. 445 
( 7 ) (1945) N.Z.L.R. 729 
Myers C.J. pointed out that while it was not uncommon for a 
pre-emptive rights article to provide that the notice to the 
company is to be irrevocable, the present articles did not contain 
any such provision. He contrasted the earlier case of Edmonds v 
T.J. Edmonds Ltd. (l) where he thought that there must have been a 
provision in the articles in that case that the 'transfer notice' 
was to be irrevocable except with the sanction of the directors. 
The writer has not been able to find any mention of an express 
provision to this effect in the Reports of Edmonds v T.J. Edmonds Ltd(
2 ) 
but it may be said that the articles raise an implication of 
irrevocability. 
Myers C.J. did not refer to the earlier case of Smith v Wilson(
3 ) 
but came to the same conclusion. He held that there was no 
implication of irrevocability arising from the Acme Engineering Ltd. 
articles and, therefore, the notice was revocable:-
"It follows, however, in my opinion, that where there is no 
provision express or by necessary implication that the 
notice shall be irrevocable, the position is simply that of 
an ordinary agency, and if that is so, it seems to me that 
... the notice ... was clearly revocable." 
( 4) 
In the Beynon case Myers C.J. held that on the facts there was 
no concluded contract made at a meeting of the shareholders held to 
discuss the plaintiff's notice. If such a contract existed it would 
not have been in accordance with the pre-emptive rights articles 
although his Honour was not adverse to the argument that the 
irregularity could be waived by the assent of all shareholders. 
(1) (1937) N.Z.L.R. 135 (S.C.) and 527 (C.A.) 
( 2) ibid 
(3) 1901 9 S.L.T. 137 
(4) (1945) N.Z.L.R. 729, 733 
Since there was no concluded contract in breach of the 
articles, the main question involved in the Lyle & Scott case 
did not arise for decision here. 
In conclusion, it may be said that a notice to the company 
be "timeously withdrawn" in the absence of any express or 
implied provision in the company's articles. (l) It is too late 
if any contract is concluded with other shareholders. Furthermore, 
in accordance with the obiter statements of the House of Lords 
in Lyle v Scott v Scott's Trustees (
2 ) a shareholder will not 
be permitted to assert that the notice is revoked or withdrawn 
if they have not terminated their contract which is formed in 
breach of the articles. 
(1) see also Cohefn & Sons Pty. Ltd. 
(2) (1959) A.C. 763 
(1969) 2 N.Z.L.R. 593 
PART IV 
THE POSITION INTER PARTES WHEN A 
TRANSACTION IS IN BREACH OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARTICLES 
The House of Lords' decision in Lyle & Scott v Scott's Trustees(l) 
held that if the vendors of shares adhere to an agreement made in 
breach of the articles, they can be compelled to give notice to the 
company of their desire to transfer them. A company or (in some 
circumstances) its shareholders may sue to enforce the pre-emptive 
rights articles against other shareholders. 
It is now proposed to consider the position inter partes. 
The company will not always insist on its rights. It may already 
be in the control of the person who is attempting to purchase shares 
in breach of the pre-emptive rights article. 
The first case that should be mentioned is the decision of the 
House of Lords in Hunter v Hunter. (
2 ) Their Lordships were (amongst 
other things) concerned with the validity of a transfer by way of 
security in breach of the pre-emptive rights article of the company 
concerned. The lower courts had not been unanimous in their views 
as to the effectiveness of the transfer. 
Viscount Hailsham L.C. thought that the tra-saction in breach 
of the articles could have been regularised by the assent of all 
shareholders. (3 ) Lord MacMillan concurred in the Lord Chancellor's 
opinion. (4 ) A passage in Lord Russell of Killowen's opinion tends to 
support the view of Viscount Hailsham. On the other hand, Lord Atkin 
took an opposing view:-
"The effect of Article 17 in my opinion is to provide the means 
and the only means by which a member of the company can form an 
agreement for the sale of shares, which can only be constituted 
by the act of a secretary as agent for seller and purchaser 
declaring a contract to be concluded at the price 
(1) (1959) A.C. 763 
(2) (1936) A.C. 222 
(3) ibid 248 
(4) ibid 264 
fixed by the auditor. That was not done in this case, and in 
my opinion no rights arose between the bank and Harry Hunter 
under any contract of sale either equitable or legal." {l) 
Hunter v Hunter (2 ) was discussed in the Irish case of 
(3) 
In Re Hafner; Olhausen v Powderley. Black J. at first instance 
preferred the view that the transaction in question was valid between 
t he parties although it was in breach of the pre-emptive rights 
articles. He thought that Hunter v Hunter probably turned upon 
the special nature of a mortgagee's power of sale. (
4 ) Hunter's 
case dealt with a 'special set of facts' (S) and did not purport 
to ove rrule earlier authority (
6 ) to the effect that a transfer 
in breach of the articles remains effective between the parties. 
He did not need to finally d ecide the point, and the Supreme Court 
on appeal hardly touched upon it. O'Sullivan C.J. in delivering 
the judgme nt of the Supreme Court did say, however, that the 
directors in this case could waive the ir pre-emptive rights. 
In the late r d e cision o f Ha wk s v McArthur (?} Vaisey J. 
agreed with Black J. in the prev ious c ase that Hunter v Hunter 
mus t be read as limited to the situation where there is a sale 
by a mortgagee. He continue d:-
"I find the very greatest difficulty in seeing how I ought to 
apply the decision in Hunter v Hunter to the facts of this case. 
On general principles, in such circumstances as those of the 
present case where a man who has an interest in shares in a 
company receives something for the sale of those shares and 
executes under seal a transfer of those shares for that 
(1 ) ibid 261 
(2 ) (1936) A.C. 222 
(3 ) (1943) I.R. 426 
(4 ) (1943) I.R. 426, 454 
(5 ) ibid 456 
(6 ) e.g. Casey v Bentley (1902) 1 I.R. 376; Hawkins v Matty 3 Ch. 
App. 188; R. v Londonderry & Coleraine Rly. Co. 13 Q.B. 998; 
R. v Wing 17 Q.B. 645 
( 7 ) (1951) 1 A.E.R. 22 
purpose, I cannot bring myself to suppose that Hunter v Hunter 
constrains me to hold that everything done in that transaction 
is a complete nullity." (l) 
He, therefore, held the transfer in contravention of the 
pre-emptive rights article resulted in the purchasers obtaining 
an equitable interest. 
It is now necessary to turn to the leading New Zealand 
decision of Gold v Penny. <
2 ) Here the respondent on appeal 
became a shareholder in a company on the basis of a promise by 
the appellant to repurchase the shares from the respondent 
"in the event of the respondent at any time becoming dissatisfied 
with his position with or investment of capital in the company." 
After the company was formed the respondent commenced 
work with it but about six weeks later his employment was 
terminated and he called upon the appellant to repurchase his 
shares. The appellant refused to do so. 
Article 10 (a) of the company (the so-called pre-emptive 
rights article (
3 )) provided that no share was to be transferred 
unless and until the 'rights of pre-emption' conferred by that 
article were complied with. On the day of the Supreme Court 
hearing, the managing director of the company produced a notice 
expressing the respondent's desire to transfer his shares to the 
appellant. The notice appointed the directors the agents of the 
respondent for the purpose and stated that the proposed transfer 
was pursuant to an earlier oral agreement. The notice did not, 
however, comply with the requirements of the pre-emptive rights 
article. (4 ) Upon receipt of this notice, the directors by 
resolution approved the proposed transfer and agreed to accept 
the transfer to the appellant for registration. 
( 1 ) (19 51 ) 1 Al 1 E . R. 2 2 , 2 7 
(2) (1960) N.Z.L.R. 1032 
(3) see (1960) N.Z.L.R. 1032, 1058 per Cleary & Hutchinson J.J. 
(4) ibid 1038 per Hardie Boyes J. 
Hardie Boys held that the existence of an oral agreement had 
been proved, and entered judgment for the plaintiff decreeing specific 
performance. One arguement raised for the appellant was that the oral 
agr eement for purchase was ineffective because of the pre-emptive 
r ights article. 
Cleary & Hutchison J.J. in a joint judgment delivered by 
Cle ary J. turned to the recent decision of Lyle & Scott v Scott's 
Tr ustees {l) After mentioning the precise point of decision they 
continued:-
" ... disregarding anything that might arise from the fact 
that the respondent made his agreement with the appellant 
before the company was formed, it would mean that, at all 
events from the time the respondent called upon the 
appellant to buy the shares the respondent was a member 
who desired to sell and was obliged to give a transfer 
notice to the directors." <
2
> 
In the present case - unlike Lyle & Scott v Scott's Trustees -
t he company had not complaine d about the breach of its articles. 
The directors, in fact, took steps to approve the transaction. 
The Court of Appeal, therefore, had to consider the question 
whe ther the agreement was a nullity. If this was so, it would not 
be competent for the directors to regularise the transaction. The 
Court of Appeal was not dire ctly concerned with the further 
que stion of whether any rights passed under the agreement. This 
wa s passed over:-
"Assuming for present purposes that no beneficial interest 
in the shares could pass under an agreement in conflict with 
the articles - a matter that has not been authoritatively 
decided - the question remains whether such an agreement is 
a nullity." {3 ) 
Cleary J. and Hutchison J. referred to the difference of 
op inion between Viscount Hailsham and Lord Atkin in Hunter v Hunter 
(1 ) (1959 ) A.C. 763 
(2 ) ibid 1060 
(3 ) ibid 1060 per Cleary & Hutchison J.J. 
and mentioned that the passage in Lord Atkin's judgment which 
( 1) 
has already been cited, may only have been directed to the 
question whether there are any legal or equitable rights arising. (
2 ) 
They also referred to the judgment of Myers C.J. in Beynon v Acme 
. . d ( 3 ) h h . . . d . Engineering Lt. were t e varying opinions expresse in Hunter v 
Hunter were mentioned although the Chief Justice did not need 
to express a final view on the point. 
Cleary & Hutchinson J.J. preferred the views expressed by 
Viscount Hailsham. It was competent for the directors to 
regularise the transactions although they though that what was 
done may have been partly a waiver and partly compliance with 
the articles. Their Honours considered that it was 'unreasonable' 
that an agreement in ·breach of the articles could not be enforced 
even if all those having rights under the articles agreed :-
"The purpose of pre-emptive provisions in articles is to 
restrict the shareholder's power to dispose of his shares 
until the pre-emptive provisions have been complied with 
and exhausted. This purpose may be achieved, and the 
rights of the company and the shareholders may be secured 
without holding that an agreement made in breach of the 
term of the articles is void ab initio and incapable of 
subsequent regularisation." 
( 4) 
Gresson P. took a different approach. He mentioned the 
differing judicial opinion expressed in Hunter v Hunter and the 
fact that the relevant part of their Lordships' speeches was 
strictly obiter. He cited Re Hafner (







"The position may be that if a shareholder sells his shares 
without complying with the provisions of the articles of 
association restricting transfer the purchaser becomes 
(19 3 6) A.C. 222; 261 
(1960) N.Z.L.R. 1032; 1061 
(1945) N.Z.L.R. 729 
ibid 1061 
(1943) I. R. 426 
the equitable owner of the shares, though a mortgagee of the 
shares may not be entitled to sell the equitable interest." 
(1) 
Gresson P. thought that the distinguishing feature of the present 
case was that the restriction in the articles was on both selling 
a nd transferring, and cons equently the agreement was subject to 
t he articles before an "unexceptional" contract could be made. 
His Honour would thus appear to draw a distinction between articles 
r estricting 'transfer' and articles restricting both selling 
and transferring. There is a difficulty with this approach. We 
have the authority of Lords Reid and Keith in Lyle & Scott v 
Scott's Trustees for the view that the word 'transfer' in 
pre-emptive rights articles should be interpreted to include a 
s ale and purchase agreement. Moreover, all of their Lordships 
would agree that if a sha r e holder agrees to sell his shares, 
he is 'desirous of transfe r ring' and must give notice to the 
company. Thus whe the r the restriction is on both selling and 
t ransferring or me r e l y on tra nsferring, any equitable rights 
t hat could arise woul d be n ega t ed . It is submitted that the 
d istinction does not have a sati s factory basis exc ept in one 
r egard. Sometime s t h e a r t ic l es will specifically re s trict the 
e xecution and registra ti on o f a transfer and nothing e lse. 
the word 'transfer' is u sed in its narrow meaning. 
Here 
The joint judgrnent o f Cleary & Hutchinson J.J. does not raise 
this distinction. The ir Honours applied the dicta of Viscount 
Hailsham in Hunter v Hunte r (
2 ) to the present situation where 
the restriction is expressly upon both selling and transferring. 
In summary of the decisions that have been considered in 




An agreement for s ale a nd purchase or transfer in breach 
of pre-emptive rights is a nullity and ineffective for all 
(1960) N.Z.L.R. 1032, 1047 
(1936) A.C. 222 • 
purposes between the parties thereto. This approach is 
( 1) supported by Lord Atkin in Hunter v Hunter. 
(2) The agreement for sale and purchase or transfer is not a 
nullity but cannot have any effect inter partes unless and 
until it is assented to by all the directors or 
shareholders, as the case may be, who have rights under 
the articles. In support of this approach, the dicta of 
Viscount Hailsham L.C. and Lords Macmillan and Russell in 
Hunter v Hunter can be cited. The joint judgment of Cleary 
& Hutchinson J.J. in Gold v Penny (2 ) also tends to support 
this approach, as does the judgment of Myers C.J. in 
Benyon v Acme Engineering Ltd. 
( 3) 
(3) The sale and purchase agreement or transfer is effective inter 
partes to pass equitable rights in the purchaser. These 
rights are liable to be defeated if the company or its 
shareholders enforce the provisions of the pre-emptive 
rights articles. This view is taken in Re Hafner, ( 4 ) 
Hawks v McArthur (5 ) and (to the extent already mentioned) 
by Gresson P. in Gold v Penny. 
The second approach has the greatest amount of support 
in New Zealand. As pointed out by Cleary & Hutchinson J.J. in their 
joint judgment in Gold v Penny, the purpose of the pre-emptive 
rights articles can be achieved without holding that an agreement 
made in breach of them is a nullity. If the third approach above 
is adopted, any equitable rights arising are always subject to 
the contingency that a company may enforce the articles. The 
equitable rights would not become absolute until the 
( 1) (1936) A.C. 222; 261 
( 2) ( 19 6 0) N.Z.L.R. 1032 
( 3) (1945) N.Z.L.R. 729 
( 4) (1943) I. R. 426 
( 5) (1951) 1 All E.R. 22 
shareholders or directors having rights under the articles 
assented to the sale and purchase agreement. Gold v Penny 
is authority for the view that this assent may be given even on 
the day of an action for specific performance; the equitable 
rights necessary to support an action for specific performance 
will arise, at the latest, when this assent is given. 
PART V 
TRUSTS OF SHARES 
~D 
PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARTICLES 
A suggested method of avoiding the operation of the pre-emptive 
rights articles in a company's articles of association is for the 
shareholders concerned to enter into a deed of trust with "the 
purchaser". It is proposed to turn firstly to the issue of whether 
a person is 'desirous of selling' or'desirous of transferring' his 
shares if he enters into a deed of trust or declares himself to be 
holding shares on trust for another. Then some aspects of the law 
in relation to trusts of shares will be discussed. This will help 
to evaluate the effectiveness of trusts as an avoidance device. 
A. The Applicability of Pre-emptive Rights Articles to Deeds of Trust and 
Declarations of Trust 
The judgments of Viscount Simonds and Lord Tucker in Lyle & 
Scott Ltd. v Scott's Trustees do not offer much help in deciding 
whether a deed of trust comes within the pre-emptive rights article. 
They based their judgments upon the principle that a vendor is bound 
to do everything that lies in him to perfect the title of the 
purchaser. 
Lords Reid and Keith did, however, deal with the meaning of 
'desirous of transferring' as already mentioned. (l) Lord Keith said:-
"I think a shareholder who has transferred or pretended to 
transfer the beneficial interest in a share to a purchaser 
for value is merely endeavouring by a subterfuge to escape 
from the pre-emptory provisions of the article. A share is 
(1) See Part II A ante 
of no value to anyone without the benefits it confers. A sale 
of a share is a sale of the beneficial rights that it confers 
and to sell or purport to sell the beneficial rights without 
the title to the share is, in my opinion, a plain breach of 
article 9."(l) 
The above passage would see0 to apply (mutatis mutandis) 
equally as much to a deed of trust as it does to an outright sale 
o f an equitable interest. L.S. Sealy <
2 ) considers that this 
s tatement of Lord Keith's must be read in the light of the facts 
of Lyle & Scott Ltd. v Scott's Trustees where it was planned and 
agreed that title should be transferred and that it was by virtue 
o f the contract for sale and purchase that the assignment of 
beneficial rights occurre d. This may have been so in Lyle & Scott Ltd. v 
Scott's Trustees but it is submitted that there is nothing in either 
t he passage above or in the rest of Lord Keith's speech that suggests 
t hat he intended his obs e rvations to be limited to the case in hand. 
Some indication of Lord Reid's position on this point may be 
de rived from his judgment. He said:-
" ... the ordinary meaning of 'transfer' is simply to hand over 
or part with something; and a shareholder who agrees to sell 
is parting with something." (3 ) 
A person who declares himself as trustee for another or enters 
i nto a deed of trust in connection with shares which he owns is 
'parting' with something - the beneficial interest in the shares 
concerned. It is not altogether clear, however, that the pure trust 
(1) (1959) A.C. 763 ~ 785 
(2) (1960) C.L.J. 28 @ 29 
(3) ibid 778 
situation was contemplated to be included in the above words. 
The courts have shown themselves willing to construe pre-emptive 
rights articles liberally and they may well be prepared to follow the 
lead of Lord Keith especially and prevent the avoidance of such 
articles by the transfer of beneficial interests. In view of this 
uncertainty some recently formed companies contain a provision in their 
pre-emptive rights articles that is expressly designed to prevent 
dealing in beneficial interests. (l) 
An even more fundamental question is raised by the relationship 
between trusts of shares and pre-emptive rights articles - is a 
company entitled to regulate the dealing in beneficial interests 
simpliciter. This question has not yet been directly raised for 
decision. In Hunter v Hunter (
2 ) the House of Lords held that 
the beneficial interest in shares could not be disposed of 
independently of the legal interest. However, it was pointed out 
by Vaisey J. in Hawks v McArthur( 3 )that this was a sale by a 
mortgagee to which special considerations apply. A passage in the 
speech of Lord Atkin in Hunter v Hunter is relevant in this 
connection:-
"The mortgage it is true is an equitable mortgage but of the 
whole legal interest. It seems to me to be without principle or 
precedent to construe a power of sale in such cases as including 
a power to agree to sell either the whole or part of the 
mortgagor's equitable interest divested of the legal title." (
4 ) 
(1) A pre-emptive rights article containing such a provision is 
set out in Appendix III 
(2) (1936) A.C. 222 
( 3 ) ( 19 5 1 ) 1 Al 1 E . R . 2 2 
(4) (1936) A.C. 222, 261 
(1) 
L.S. Sealy suggests that a company cannot lawfully regulate 
dealing in beneficial interests in shares as this would be contrary 
to the principle of company law that a company is not concerned with 
beneficial interests in shares. He mentioned that Mcclelland J. 
in Australian Fixed Trusts Pty. Ltd. v Clyde Industries Ltd. (2 ) did 
not consider a further possible objection to the alteration of the 
articles. This was that the alteration would require the company 
to become aware of the equitable interests in the shares. ( 3 ) 
More importantly for present purposes Sealy considered that 
'on principle' a company should not be entitled to require notice 
of trusts. He could find scant authority in support of this 
proposition. (4 ) In the absence of any binding decision to the 
contrary, the writer prefers the view that a company may concern 
itself with trusts if it chooses to do so. The existence of trusts 
become highly important in the takeover situation and unless a 
company can regulate dealings in beneficial interests through 
pre-emptive rights articles such trusts may provide a convenient 
means for a takeover. 
( 1) (1960) C.L.J. 28, 29 
(2) (1950) 59 S.R. (N.S.W.) 33 
( 3) cf. Section 125 of the Companies Act 
(4) (1960) C.L.J. 28 @ 30 
LAW LIBnARY 
V CTORIA UhJIVEnSITY OF WELLINGTON 
B, The Law Relating to Trusts of Shares 
In this section we are mainly concerned with the rights of a 
beneficiary under a deed of trust for shares. The main rights 
with which we will be concerned are the right to dividends and 
more importantly the right to dictate the way in which any voting 
rights are exercised. 
A beneficiary would be entitled (in the absence of any 
express provision in the trust) to demand from the trustees the 
dividends. The converse is that the beneficiary must indemnify 
the trustees for any calls made upon the shares. The general 
principle is stated by Lord Lindley in Hardoon v Belilios:- (l) 
"The plainest principles of justice require that the 
cestui que trust who gets all the benefit of the 
property should bear its burden unless he can show 
some good reason why his trustee should bear them 
himself." (2 ) 
If such an arrangement as described above was contemplated, 
then it would be advisable for the beneficiary to obtain 
executed proxies in his favour because of the present uncertainty 
as to the extent to which trustees can be compelled to exercise 
their voting power in favour of the beneficiaries. 
Kirby v Wilkins( 3 ) is the first case that needs to be 
considered. The chairman of the board of the company held a 
group of shares on trust to use or sell them for the benefit 
of the company. Some shareholders brought an action to 
prevent the chairman from voting without a direction from the 
(1) (1901) A.C. 118 
(2) ibid 123 
( 3) ( 19 2 9) 2 Ch. 4 4 4 
company. Romer J. rejected this contention:-
"Where a shareholder holds shares as a bare trustee for a 
third person, he is no doubt obliged to exercise his 
voting power in the way that the cestui que trust desires, 
but unless and until the cestui que trust has indicated 
his wish as to the way in which the voting power should 
be exercised, there is no reason why the nominee should 
not exercise the voting power vested in him as trustee. 
He holds that voting power upon trust, but, unless and 
until the cestui que trust intervenes, he must exercise it 
according to his directions in the best interests of his 
• II ( 1) cestui que trust. 
This decision states a general principle that a beneficiary 
is entitled to direct the trustee to exercise his voting power 
in accordance with his direction. Some limitations that 
must be put upon this statement come to mind. There may be a 
class of beneficiaries in which case it would seem that the 
class would have to be unanimous. If they were in disagreement 
an order of the court would be necessary. Most of the 
difficulties in relation to the general principle have arisen 
in situations where the trustees have also been directors 
of the company. 
In Butt v Kelson ( 2 ) the defendents were trustees of a 
large proportion of the shares in a company. They had got 
themselves appointed directors under the provision of the 
testator's will. The plaintiff who had a life interest in 
a large proportion of the testator's estate claimed a 
declaration that he was entitled to inspect all documents 
which came into the possession of the trustees as directors 
of the company. 
(1) ibid 454 
(2) (1952) 1 Ch. 197 
In the High Court, a declaration in terms sought was 
granted but the Court of Appeal did not agree with the form of 
the declaration. Romer L.J. gave the leading judgment. He 
pointed out a number of undesirable consequences that would flow 
from the granting of the declaration obtained in the court below. (l) 
It would result in the beneficiary, who was not even on the register 
of members, obtaining information which would not be available to 
the ordinary registered shareholder. (2 ) The information could be 
highly prejudicial. He further pointed out that the other share-
holders might have objections to the beneficiary having 
unrestricted access to the information. ( 3 ) 
Romer L.J. considered that the correct approach was put forward 
by counsel for the appellants. He had submitted that there was a 
distinction to be drawn between an unincorporated business and a 
business carried on by a company in which the trustees hold shares. 
In the first situation, it is well recognised that the beneficiaries 
could see the documents relating to the business as they are the 
virtual owners. This principle is one of general application, (4 ) 
and applies to all trust documents in the absence of special 
circumstances. (S) 
When the beneficiaries are interested in the shares of an 
incorporated company the only control over the directors which the 
beneficiaries can seek to obtain through the courts is a control 
through the medium of the shares. ( 6 ) Romer L.J. summarised the 







the beneficiaries are entitled to be treated as though 




see In Re Cowin, Cowin v Gravett (1886) 33 Ch. D. 179 
cf. Re Fairbairn (deceased) (1967) V.R. 633 ---------'------
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"with the advantages and disadvantages which are 
involved in that position, and that they can compel the trustee 
d irectors, if necessary, to use their votes as the beneficiaries, 
or as the court, if the beneficiaries themselves are not in 
agreement, think proper, even to the extent of altering the 
articles of association if the trust shares carry votes 
s ufficient for that purpose." (l) 
Since the trust holding in this case gave complete control 
of the company Romer L.J. considered that subject to three 
requirements the directors should allow inspection not because 
they are compelled to d o so as directors but as a "short circuit" 
to an order compelling them to use their voting power to achiev e 
th is effect. The three requirements were that the plaintiff must 
specify the documents which he wishes to see; he must make out a 
proper case for seeing them and lastly he is not met by any valid 
ob jection by the other beneficiaries or by the directors on 
behalf of the company. The Court of Appeal thereupon gave liberty 
to apply to the court in relation to any document which he desires 
to see and to which he is refused inspection. 
It is suggested that this order was made upon a dubious basis. 
The beneficiaries' only rights of control relating to the documents 
1n question were those that could be enforced through the shareholding 
of the company. Romer L.J. thought that the directors should allow 
inspection because ultimately they could be compelled to exercise 
their voting powers to bring about the change desired. It is, 
however, a different matter to ascribe some sort of legal basis to 
the "short circuit" and lay down conditions for its exercise . 
At one point in the judg • ment already mentioned, Romer L.J. said that 
t he directors should give inspection:-
" not because they can be compelled to do so as directors 
but as a short circuit, if one may so describe it to an order 
compelling them to use their voting powers so as to bring 
(1) ibid 207 
• • ff d • h • II ( 1 ) about what the plainti esires to ac ieve. 
By giving liberty to the plaintiff to apply to the 
court for an order as to inspection, Romer L.J. appears to 
be granting relief in a situation in which, as he has already 
asserted, the plaintiff is not strictly entitled to it. 
The next case for consideration is In Re George 
Whichelow Ltd. ( 2 ) This was a similar factual situation to Butt v 
( 3) f. . . . Kelson but here the bene iciaries directed the trustees 
to exercise their voting power in a certain way. The trustees 
refused to do this and said that they would exercise their 
votes in accordance with their discretion. The trustees in this 
case do not appear to have been directors but the case is 
important because it refers to the earlier case of Butt v Kelson 
and is also mentioned in a later Australian case which is yet 
to be mentioned. 
The plaintiffs in In Re George Whichelow Ltd. ( 4 ) claimed 
to be all those who were entitled to the beneficial interest 
in the trust shares and consequently as a group they could 
direct the trustees how to vote at a meeting of the company. 
Upjohn J. rejected the contention that the trustees had received 
a direction from all those beneficially entitled. The shares 
were on trust to three married women for life and a remainder 
to issue. There were children but all were over twenty one. 
The youngest of the life beneficiaries was fifty two. It was 
held that as a matter of law it could not be said that these three 
women were passed the age of child bearing. 
The writer does not dispute this part of the judgement but 
Upjohn J. also made comments upon the case of Butt v Kelson 
which may be open to question. He referred to well established 
(1) ibid 207 
( 2) (1954) 1 W.L.R. 5 
( 3 ) (1952) Ch. 197 
( 4) (1954) 1 W.L.R. 5 
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authority that where trustees have been given a pure discretion 
as to the exercise of a power, the courts will not enforce the 
exercise of the power against the wishes of the trustees 
although it will prevent them from exercising it improperly. (l) 
Upjohn J. continued:-
"I think that the case of Butt v Kelson <2 ) is difficult to 
reconcile with those cases and I am not prepared to grant 
any relief upon an interlocutory motion. Furthermore, in my 
judgement the right way of looking at the position is that 
here are trustees ... who are anxious to exercise their 
discretion." ( 3 ) 
It is submitted that the cases cited by Upjohn J. are 
distinguishable. They relate to the exercise of a pure power. 
The voting rights which attach to shares are trust property. 
If beneficiaries agree, they are entitled to direct the trustees 
as to how the voting rights are to be exercised. If a pure 
power given to the trustees by the testator was involved, then 
the beneficiaries could not intervene as long as it was not 
exercised improperly. Similarly, if the trustees are directors 
the beneficiaries cannot influence the exercise of their powers 
in that capacity directly. Their only remedy is through the use 
of their power to direct the voting. 
The Supreme Court of Victoria has recently considered the 
cases already mentioned in Walker v Willis. ( 4 ) Here all the 
shares were held by the trustees who were also the directors. 
Fifty per cent were held for the plaintiff contingently upon 
him attaining the age of twenty five. The rest were held partly 
by the trustees themselves and partly for members of his family. 
(1) See Tempest v Lord Camoys (1882) 21 Ch. D. 571@ 578 
per Jessel M.R. 
(2) (1952) Ch. 197 
( 3 ) 
( 4) 
(1954) 1 W.L.R. 5 @ 8 
(1969) V.R. 778 
The directors decided to call the annual meeting for the 
10th October in one year. The articles provided that all the 
directors should retire at the annual general meeting. The 
plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the 
holding of the meeting until he attained the age of twenty five 
in the following month and became a registered shareholder. The 
directors admitted that they intended to prevent the plaintiff 
from voting by holding the annual general meeting in October. 
The plaintiff founded his argument upon two bases. The 
first was the principle that a director could be restrained 
from the improper exercise of his fiduciary powers. The case 
of Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty. Ltd. (l) was cited for the 
proposition that directors could not use their fiduciary powers 
to perpetuate their control over the affairs of the company. 
Lush J. held that since the plaintiff was not the actual 
shareholder and was not yet absolutely entitled to the beneficial 
interest he could not rely on Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty. Ltd. 
which provides the basis of a remedy for a shareholder against 
the directors. ( 2 ) The plaintiff did not have the necessary 
s tanding. Lush J. further held that the plaintiff had not 
made out a prima facie case of bad faith. 
It was further argued for the plaintiff that the trustees' 
powers as directors were in effect trust property and that they 
should regulate the affairs of the company so that when the 
plaintiff reached twenty five his voting powers would be able 
to be exercised at the annual general meeting of the year in 
question. ( 3 ) Lush J. followed Butt v Kelson ( 4 ) and rejected 
this argument. 
were not trust 
benefit of the 
The powers 
property but 
( 5 ) 
company. 
(1) (1950) 82 C.L.R. 1 
( 2) (1969) V.R. 778, 781 
( 3 ) ibid 780 
(4) (1952) Ch. 197 
( 5) (1969) V .R. 778, 781 
of the defendant trustees as directors 
were rather to be exercised for the 
The decision to call the annual general 
mee t i n g was taken in the exercise of the directors ' powers of 
management. The powers i n volved were not trustees ' powers 
as such. The plaintiff could not, therefore , direct the trus t ees 
to exercise these powers for his benefit . 
(1 ) 
There remained the question whether t he plaintiff could 
direct the trustees how the voting power of the trust shares 
was to be exercised at the general meeting . Lush J . held , 
followin g In Re George Whi chelow Ltd. ( 2 ) that as the plaint iff 
was not absolutely entitled to the beneficial interest in the 
shares he could not direct the trustees as to how they should 
vote . ( 3 ) 
We have now seen some of the limit a t ions that must be put 
. . . d K . w · 1k· ( 4 ) h upon t he principle enunciate in irby v i ins tat a 
trustee must exercise the voting power in accordance with the 
directions of his beneficiaries. The later cases seek to 
define the extent of the principle especially in relation t o 
the situation where the trustees are also the directors of the 
company . This does have relevance to corporate raiders who 
may wish t o use the trust as a means of getting around a 
pre - emptive rights article . Even if the directors of a company 
are the t rustees this does not, of itself , ensure control of the 
board . Different considerations apply if the beneficiary has 
a major i ty shareholding - he could then use his powers to 
remove the directors . 
(1) ibid 781 - 782 
(2) (1954) 1 W.L.R. 5 
(3) (1969) V.R. 778, 781 
(4) (1929) 2 Ch. 444 
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PART VI 
THE VALUATION OF SHARES OFFERED TO SHAREHOLDERS 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARTICLES 
Pre-emptive rights articles will almost inevitably provide 
some method for the determination of the price of shares that 
are to be sold to the other members of the company. It is 
usual to provide that failing agreement, the price is to be 
determined either by arbitration (l) or by the company's auditor 
or accountant or other named individual. (2 ) In the second 
situation, the articles may provide that the auditors are to 
act as experts and not as arbitrators. (3 ) Dale & Sclater has(
4
) 
a precedent which after providing for the auditor to act as an 
expert and not as an arbitrator, e xpressly excludes the 
provisions of the Arbitration Act 1908. It is intended to 
concentrate on valuations made b y auditors or other nominated 
officials. 
A. THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH VALUATIONS CAN BE SET ASIDE 
The basic statement of the law is that of Sir John 
Romilly M.R. in the early case of Collier v Mason. (
5
) He said:-
"This court, upon the principle laid down by Lord Eldon, 
must act on the valuation, unless there be proof of some 
mistake, or some improper motive, I do not say a fraudulent 
one, as if the valuer had valued something not included 
or had valued it on a wholly erroneous principle ... or 
even, in the absence of any proof of any one of these 
(1) e.g. Gold v Penny (1960) N.Z.L.R. 1032 
(2) e.g. Lyle & Scott v Scott's Trustees; Dale & Sclater, 
Private Companies in New Zealand (1968) @ 87-88; Arenson v 
Arenson (1973) 2 W.L.R. 553; Beynon v Acme Engineering Co. 
Ltd. (1945) N.Z.L.R. 729 
(3) See Dean v Prince (1954) 1 Ch. 409; cf. Arenson v Arenson 
(1973) 2 W.L.R. 553 where there was an a greerae nt to this 
effect although not embodied in the articles . 
(4) Private Companies in New Zealand (196 G) G7- GG 
(5) (1858) 25 Beav. 200 
things, if the price was so excessive or so small 
as only to be explainable by reference to some 
such cause " ( 1) 
This passage was accepted as correct by the Court of Appeal 
in Dean v Prince. (2 ) Evershed M.R. did not attempt to lay down 
any exhaustive definitions but held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to succeed if she could show that the auditor had 
made a mistake of a substantial character or had materially 
misdirected himself in the course of his valuation. (
3 ) In a 
later passage he said that the valuation could be set aside if 
the auditor made a "material mistake or erred in principle~ 
Denning L.J. considerably expanded upon the passage 
contained in the judgrnent of Sir John Romilly M.R. in Collier v 
Mason. ( 4 ) He first ·pointed out that the auditor was to act as 
an expert and give his opinion as to the value of the shares. 
As valuation is large ly a matter of opinion, it will be 
difficult to say that it is wrong but the courts will upset 
a valuation under certain conditions:-
"It can be impeache d not only for fraud but also for 
mistake ... For instance, if the expert added up his 
figures wrongly; or took something into account which he 
ought not have taken into account, or conversely; or 
interpreted the agreement wrongly; or proceeded on some 
erroneous principle ... Even if the court cannot point 
to the actual error, nevertheless, if the figure itself 
is so extravagantly large or so inadaquately small that 
the only conclusion is that he must have gone wrong 
somewhere, then the court will interfere .•. On matters of 
opinion the courts will not interfere; but for mistake 
(1) ibid 204 
( 2) ( 19 5 4) 1 Ch. 4 0 9 
(3) ibid 418 
(4) (1858) 25 Beav. 200, 204 
of jurisdiction or of principle, and for mistake of 
law, including interpretation of documents, and for 
miscarriage of justice, the courts will interfere ... " 
Wynn-Parry J. accepted the principle laid down by 
Sir John Romilly M.R. in Collier v Mason as being applicable 
to the present case, and took a very similar view to that of 
Denning L.J. 
(1) 
In Frank H. Wright (Constructions) Ltd v Frodoor Ltd. 
(2) 
also a case where the binding force of a valuation not 
contained in the articles of association was challenged -
Roskill J. said:-
"The circumstances in which the court will interfere with 
a certificate of this kind are extremely restricted. The 
court will not and should not be astute to upset the 
decisions of those whom the parties have freely chosen to 
decide their problems for them ... Parties take their 
experts (whether accountants or otherwise) for better or 
worse with the attendant risks of error which are 
inherent in the ordinary human weaknesses of any tribunal. 
But there are some occasions which are well defined when 
the court will and must interfere." 
( 3) 
case 
Roskill J. then referred to Collier v Mason and the later 
of Weekes v Gallard ( 4 ) which was also decided by 
Sir John Romilly M.R. He referred to the judgments delivered 
by the Court of Appeal in Dean v Prince and considered them to 
be applicable to the case before him. The judgment of Harman J. 
in the court below was cited for the proposition that the 
courts can interfere if the valuation is a "speaking 
(1) ibid 427 
(2) (1967) l W.L.R. 506 
(3) ibid 524 
(4) (1869) 21 L.T. 655 
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valuation" but not otherwise. We will return to this part 
of Harman J's judgment in connection with a later case. 
The next case that should be mentioned is the decision of 
Ungoed-Thomas J. in Jones (M) v Jones (R.R.) !1 ) The learned 
judge in the course of his judgment cited both Collier v Mason 
and Lord Denning's judgment in Dean v Prince with apparent 
approval. He held that the valuation there was made on a wrong 
basis and, consequently, was a valuation made on an "erroneous 
( 2) principle". 
In none of the cases so far considered has the Court of 
Appeal decision in Dean v Prince been doubted but it now must 
be read in the light of certain observations of Lord Denning M.R. 
in Arenson v Arenson. (3 ) This case (as reported) is mainly 
concerned with the liability of auditors for negligence in 
making a valuation. The agreement under which the valuation 
was made was not embodied in the articles, but nothing seems 
to turn on this factor. 
The other two members of the Court of Appeal in this case 
did not discuss the grounds upon which a valuation could be 
held not to be binding upon the parties. Lord Denning thought 
fit to examine this area of the law to shorten the task of 
others that may have to deal with it. In the course of his 
judgment he considered the binding force of arbitrations and 
certificates for building or engineering work. Of particular 
interest for present purposes are his observations upon 
agreements to accept a valuation made by an expert. His 
Lordship started with the position at Common Law where the 
parties are bound :-
"Even if he makes a mistake in his calculations or makes 
(1) (1971) l W.L.R. 840 
(2) ibid 854 
(3) (1973) 2 W.L.R. 553; (1973) 2 All E.R. 234 
the valuation on what one or other considers to be a 
wrong basis, still they are bound by their agreement 
to accept it. If his valuation is not a speaking 
valuation - if he gives no reasons or does not explain 
the basis on which he has proceeded - clearly they are 
bound." ( l) 
Lord Denning then considered whether it made any 
difference if the expert gives reasons, and pointed out that 
Harman J. at first instance in Dean v Prince (2 ) had held as 
a preliminary matter that as the auditors had given reasons 
for their decision, a court could inquire into their 
correctness. Harman J. reached his conclusion by analogy with 
the situation where trustees or directors exercise discretionary 
powers. A court will not force these to break their silence 
but if they should do so a plaintiff may challenge their 
motives in court. 
Lord Denning was not prepared to give unqualified 
approval to Harman J.'s conclusion:-
"This may be right, though I am not quite sure 
about it. At any event, that exception stated by Harman J. 
does not apply in this case. Here the auditors did not 
give any reasons, nor did they state the basis on which 
they made their valuation. They kept silent. Undoubtedly 
at Common Law their valuation was final and binding and 
not open to be questioned by the parties or either of them." (3 ) 
He then turned to the position in equity:-
"In equity, however, it may be different. Sir John 
Romilly M.R. once said that a court of equity might 
(1) ibid 560 
(2) (1953) Ch. 590 
(3) (1973) 2 W.L.R. 553, 560-561 
refuse specific performance if the valuation was 
influenced by fraud, mistake or miscarriage 
But some years later he said that 'the only defence 
to such a suit (for specific performance) would be 
fraud or collusion' see Weekes v Gallard. (l) 
Howsoever that may be, I have found no case in which 
equity has intervened on the ground that the valuer 
has made a mistake." (2 ) 
His Lordship cited the cases already dealt with in the 
preceeding pages and found that Jones (M) v Jones (R.R.) ( 3 ) 
was the only case in which a valuation was upset. He then 
stated that:-
"Even if equity can intervene on the ground of 
mistake, there may be no room in the present case 
for the interposition of equity. There is no 
question of specific performance. The agreement 
has been fully executed ... There cannot be 
(4) restitutio in integrum." 
From the above it can be seen that Lord Denning takes 
a much more narrow approach than he took in Dean v Prince. 
He was not prepared to unreservedly accept that a "speaking 
valuation" could be challenged at Common Law despite 
settled authority in the analogous situation of arbitrations. 
It has been decided by a long series of cases - one of which 
Lord Denning cited( 5 ) - that an error of law on the face of 
the award is a ground for setting it aside. 
( 1) (1869) 21 L.T. 655 
(2) ibid 561 
(3) (1971) 1 W.L.R. 840 
(4) ibid 561 
(5) Hodgkinson v Fernie (1857) 3 C.B.N.S. 189, 202 
Lord Denning further cast doubts as to the exact extent 
to which a court would interfere in equity. In Dean v Prince 
he had said that courts could intervene if the valuation was 
made under a mistake. (l) In Arenson v Arenson he is not so 
categorical. In justification, he mentions that in Weekes v 
Gallard (2 ) Sir John Romilly M.R. said that the only defence 
to the suit would be fraud or collusion. This inconsistency 
with Collier v Mason is hard to explain. The earlier case was 
not mentioned in Weekes v Gallard, although the case of 
Parken v Whitly( 3 ) was cited in arguement in both cases. 
Another reason given for his new found doubts is that he 
could not find a case where a party had actually succeeded 
in equity simply on the ground that the valuer made a mistake. 
This may well be so, but it is submitted that this cannot 
alter the validity of a general principle if it is sound. 
Lord Denning thus reached his conclusion that the 
valuation could not be challenged in this case by an examination 
of the position at Common Law and equity in turn. The valuation 
could not be set aside in accordance with the Common Law 
because it was not a speaking order. It could not be set 
aside in equity because there was no reason for the imposition 
of equity. Specific performance could not be sought. No account 
seems to have been taken of the Rule of Law that where there is 
a conflict between the rules of equity and Common Law, equity 
should prevail. (4 ) 
In the present situation, there is a conflict in as much 
as equity would intervene in a wider variety of circumstances. 
If the auditors valuing company shares did not give any reasons 
(1) see (1954) Ch. 409, 427 
(2) (1869) 21 L.T. 655 
( 3) 1 Turn. & Russ . 3 6 6 
(4) see section 99 Judicature Act 1908 
it would not be possible to challenge their valuation at 
Common Law in the absence of fraud or collusion. In equity 
the position was different. Sir John Romilly in a passage 
already cited said that even if it could not be proved that 
the valuer had acted upon a mistake or some erroneous principle, 
nevertheless, the court would set aside the valuation if the 
price was so excessive or so small as to be explainable only 
by reference to such cause. (l) This passage, it will be 
remembered, was approved and expanded upon by Denning L.J. 
. . ( 2) in Dean v Prince. 
If the correct approach is that the rules of equity 
concerning the grounds for setting aside valuations should 
prevail, then it must follow that Lord Denning erred in 
Arenson v Arenson when he considered the position at Common 
Law and equity separately. Assuming the rules of equity to 
be now applicable to all situations, then the omission to 
give reasons in the present case should not have been fatal. 
The alleged mistake was of such substantial proportions that 
a court would have had little difficulty in inferring that 
an erroneous principle had been acted upon despite the 
absence of a 'speaking' valuation. 
While the writer favours the view that the principles of 
equity should determine the availability of a remedy in all 
cases, it is admittedly difficult to extract positive support 
for this view from decided cases. Collier v Mason and Weekes v 
Gallard were both suits for specific performance before the 
Judicature Acts. Dean v Prince was an action for a declaration. 
Harman J. at first instance, held that as the valuers had not 
chosen to keep silent, the court could question their reasons. 
(1) see 25 Beav. 200, 204 
(2) (1954) 1 Ch. 409, 427 
This is in accordance with the position at Corrrrnon Law. The 
Court of Appeal, as previously mentioned held that the applicable 
principles were contained in Collier v Mason. The preliminary 
point decided by Harman J. was not re-argued in the Court of 
Appeal. It is submitted that the Court of Appeal's acceptance 
of Collier v Mason is significant as Dean v Prince was not a 
case where an equitable remedy was being sought. Denning L.J. 
did not allude to any supposed difference between Common Law 
and equity. He, in fact, expanded considerably on the principles 
enunciated in Collier v Mason and stated that the cases about 
valuers bear some analogy with cases on domestic tribunals. He 
referred to the Court of Appeal decision in Lee v Showmen's 
Guild of Great Britain (l)in which he was a member of the court. 
It is suggested that this is a reasonable approach. In the 
area of administrative law the courts have become increasingly 
willing to review the decisions of tribunals. It is suggested 
that increased judicial activism in the field of valuations is 
also appropriate. 
It is difficult to agree with Lord Denning( 2 ) that because 
the parties have made their bed they must lie on it. Lord 
Denning was referring to a valuation of shares but the 
agreement was not contained in the articles. When the 
valuation requirement is part of the pre-emptive rights 
articles of a company the justification for the court's 
interference is even stronger. A shareholder must accept the 
. without .negotiation . . terms of the articles/lunless he nas been involved in the 
actual formation). 
Another case that is relevant to the present question 
(1) (1952) 2 Q.B. 329 
( 2) in Arenson v Arenson (1973) l W.L.R. 553, 560 
is Frank H. Wright (Constructions) Ltd. v Frodoor Ltd}l) 
Roskill J. mentioned the line of authority running from 
Collier v Mason to the Court of Appeal decision in Dean v Prince 
as well as Harman J's judgment in the same case upon the strength 
of which he concluded:-
"In the present case, Cooper Brothers have set out 
their reasons, and it is open, therefore, to the 
defendants, if they can, to seek to upset that 
certificate." (2 ) 
This was a case where specific performance was sought and, 
consequently, the position in equity was relevant on any 
interpretation of the law. A speaking order was not necessary 
and, it is submitted, the the above passage is incorrect. It 
would have been open to the defendants to upset the certificate 
regardless of whether reasons were given. 
(1) (1967) 1 W.L.R. 506 
(2) ibid 526 
B. IMMATERIAL ERRORS IN VALUATIONS 
In Frank H. Wright (Constructions) Ltd. v Frodoor Ltd. (l) 
one of the grounds upon which it was sought to set the valuation 
aside was the inclusion of the word 'not' in one of the paragraphs 
of the valuation. This did not affect the arithmetical result 
but was purely an inadvertent mistake. Roskill J. said:-
"There can be no doubt on the authorities that if this had 
been a material error, it would have entitled the 
defendants to have the certificate set aside without more." 
It was argued that even if the error did not affect the 
final sum certified, the valuation should still be set aside. 
Roskill J. referred to the judgment of Evershed M.R. in 
Dean v Prince which he considered authority for the view that 
before a court will set aside a certificate for error, the 
error must be 'material'. A material error was one which 
materially affected the result. He concluded as follows:-
"If this error had been material, it would have been 
enough to vitiate the whole of the certificate, small 
as it might be and regrettable as the consequences 
might be. But in my judgment ... this error is not 
material because it does not affect the result." 
( 3) 
(2) 
A converse situation occurred in Jones (M) v Jones (R.R.). ( 4 ) 
Here the defendants argued that an error in principle does 
not vitiate a valuation unless it can be shown that a valuation 
(1) (1967) 1 W.L.R. 506 
(2) ibid 529 
(3) ibid 529 
(4) (1971) 1 W.L.R. 840 
on the correct principle would result in a materially different 
figure. The defendants apparently relied on a passage in the 
final paragraph of the judgment of Evershed M.R. in Dean v Prince 
where he stated that although the valuer had erred in principle, 
the plaintiff had failed to establish that had the correct 
principle been considered, a materially different figure would 
have resulted. Denning L.J. and Wynn-Parry J. did not deal 
with this point as they decided that the correct principle had 
been considered. 
Ungoed Thomas J. examined the passage mentioned above 
and divided Evershed M.R.'s observations into three stages:-
" ••• in the course of arriving at this conclusion his 
observations might perhaps be read as showing that he 
took three stages: (1) that the auditor decided that the 
break up valuation was alone admissible as alternative to 
a going concern valuation: (2) that such decision was 
wrong in principle : and (3) that the objection to the 
valuation nevertheless failed because it was not proved 
that a valuation in situ or otherwise would produce a 
'materially different' figure of value from the auditor's 
valuation on a break-up basis." 
(1) 
On the assumption that his interpretation contained 
in the above passage was correct, Ungoed-Thomas J. was of the 
opinion that Evershed M.R. had reasoned incorrectly. Where a 
valuation based on a principle is challenged on the ground that 
the principle was wrong then the only inquiry was whether it 
was wrong or not:-
"It was immaterial •.• that it was wrong in principle 
for the auditor to decide that the break-up value 
was alone admissible as an alternative to the going 
(1) (1971) l W.L.R. 840, 854 
concern. It was not that decision, but the valuation 
that was being attacked as wrong in principle and the 
valuation was, in the circumstances of that case, right 
in principle. However much the auditor stumbled in 
arriving at the right principle of valuation, he arrived 
t 't 11 (1) a i • 
Ungoed Thomas J. distinguished Frank H. Wright (Constructions) 
Ltd. v Frodoor Ltd. which was a case where the mistake could 
not affect the valuation price. The difference in the present 
case was that the valuation had been made in a manner contrary 
to the directions given to the valuer. The case was one of 
"immaterial error". The correct principles had been invoked 
and the error (the insertion of the word 'not') did not indicate 
otherwise. Evershed M.R, purported to construct a quite 
different test. He seems to have held that in order to upset 
a valuation the valuer must not only have erred in principle 
but also it must be proved that a "materially different" 
valuation would have resulted had the correct principle been 
used. The twofold test was rejected by Ungoed-Thomas J.:-
" •.. I do not conclude that there is any requirement of 
general application that where a valuation is made on an 
erroneous principle, yet the valuation nevertheless stands 
unless it is shown that a valuation on the right principle 
would produce a materially different figure from the figure 
of the valuation that he made ... The authorities •.. to 
my mind establish that if a valuation is erroneous in 
principle, it is· vitiated and cannot be relied on even 
though it is not established that the valuation figure is 
wrong. " ( 1 ) 
The writer respectfully agrees with Ungoed Thomas J.'s 
· · d ( 2 ) . f th . t . conclusions. As he pointe out, i e posi ion was 
(1) (1971) 1 W.L.R. 840, 856 
(2) ibid 856 
otherwise, the plaintiff could be faced with a very heavy 
burden of proof which might be almost impossible to satisfy. 
On the facts of the present case, however, Ungoed-Thomas J. held 
that the plaintiffs had established that had the valuation 
been made upon the correct principles, a substantially higher 
figure would have been obtained. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The law relating to the valuation of shares has now been 
considered in some length. The appointment of an expert 
whether he be the auditor or an outside party is a favoured 
method of valuing the shares of a company. Such a method 
recognises that there is a large 'opinion' element in such 
valuations. Despite this, the courts must intervene to 
prevent obvious injustices between the parties in much the 
same way as they do in the case of tribunals and inferior 
courts. In the case of pre-emptive rights articles, it is 
impossible to set the price at which shares are to be sold 
at some future date. Parties to a normal contract can always 
negotiate a price before they enter into the contract. A 
shareholder is bound by the articles and the courts supervisory 
jurisdiction is thus expecially important to prevent abuse. 
APPENDIX I 
A. Dale & Sclater. p. 87-88 
(a) N o sh:u~., ,h·tl be tran,fcrrcd to a rcrson who is ,.?t 2. m:mhcr 
so l,);1g a, any mcmh.:r i, v.il:ng to r:11,·h:.isc the , '!)C at a fair 
p rice, p1,wiJ.:J th:it this rc,tri.tio n sh.,11 not ar;>lj to a tr:r.,f::r 
by a m~mb~r to th.: \,if.:, hu,L:nd, parent, br0:kr, ,:,:,~. or child 
of ~u.:h mcm l;: r. 
(b) In or,'-: r to :1sc,·1 t;,in v. hcth::r any mcmcer is \I il!ir._: to pt:r.:hc.5~ 
a sh:11.: or sh:irc, th·: prorosing tr:1nsf:ror sh:11 ;·,c N<:c in 
writing (hcrcin:,ftc r c:tl~J the Tr;:mfcr :i'\'o:i,c) tu tI-: d::,to:s of 
th:: comrany of his desire to tr.rn,f::r such sh.,:c o:-sh:,•,s. The 
Tr:insfcr Notice: m:iy incluJ-: sevcr:il sh:ircs anJ in t:I:,t c;,sc s'i:111 
opcr:ite as if it 1·c:rc a s::par,!te noti.:e in resp~.:t cf e:cb. St!:h 
Tr.,· ._';: ~.:-:.:·: ·'-: ·: , 1:: ~ ~ s:.:n 11:.:h th; r:0;-.:<-; t:~:.·":,.:·: 
e < .~:1 ~: _) .!S ~~~ f ~.; r1:..:.: f,._..,:- st.:h s'.1~!rc or ~~1.~1:s, ~'.~ ~:-.. i!l 
C1..":; < 1: d>.: r:~ c1.1·:.;-.~:1J t~:.: ~:\,.·~?: of th~ p:L\;'~Jsin.: tr~~r.:i:·_·;\,: iL r 
th.: ~.1: 0: ~~ . h ~\.:(" Qr ~!1.1.rc:) or ~r.) of thcrn to :1:-:; r.1:-r.i2:~ c f 
l~:c' c,:;1;· _,:iy :,t t:i,· p i:c ,:J:(J in su:h tr:,:,s:c-: r.u::.:. Tr.~ 
Trcn -i"cr ~L1:i,·: ~h.,!i r:.:,t be rc\L':"'-:~ e.\:cpt with the co;:;~n: 
i n ,-.;iti:.; of ~~~ ~ir.: .. tv!"s. 
(c) 1:· 11e c,·:·1pny ,h.,!J 11ith'n or.: mor.th of r.:.:cirt of Sl!Ch Tr:,:,f,r 
!',,):::: fir,J a m:.:mb:r (hcrin.,ftc:r c.d!eJ the rur,·hasin; n.:r,'.·er) 
v.ilir.; to pl!r,h:,:: the s!-1.:re or ~h~r.:s and shJ!! gi1·e noti:c tr.:.:reof 
to the rroro,in~ tr.1n,fc:r,1~ such rroro;:,g tran,kror shJIJ u;-on 





sh:ir.:s :i:_:r,·.:,! to be pur.:h_,,·J to th,; p u rch:,ing member. 
In th.: cvc·1t of :,ny di!frrcn.:e :irsing bet11t·en the rroro;:r.g tr:ir.s-
frr,r an,1 the purd1.hin~: m:.:mrcr as to th•: fair pricc of th~ sh.,re 
or sh'\rcs to h : su!J ~:1:h d11Tcr,·n:,; ,h:il be rdc-rrcd to th~ 
auJitor of th·~ rnm;'.,ny fu r hi, Lk:i, ion an-I su:h auJitor sh:dl on 
the appointm:nt of crth:.:r r .irty c.:rtify in writin~ th~ su m v.hi.:h 
in hi, or:ni,):1 is tli·~ fJir r r i:c: fr,r su.:h sh.,re or sh,res anJ i:i so 
certifying the au,li,,r s', I b.: Cl)n,iJcrcJ to be acting as an 
c'-r,rt :inJ nut n, :in arbit1.1tor an,! a.:corJin~ly th·: ,\rcir.:,:io:i 
Act I 908 or any ,\e t ,m,·nd1ng the sam:.: or in substitutio;:i thc:cfor 
sh:il not apply. 
H in any CJ\.: tk rro;,,, ing tr.1n,f:ror 3~ti:r h:1vir.g be:0rnc cound 
a s afores:1id n: tl c, dd.1ult in  11 ;in ,ferring the slnrc or s:nre, 
the comp.,ny rn:iy 1c,:,'i1e th<.: pu1, h,,: 11uncy an,1 sh:il thc:·cuj'On 
c a ti,;c the n ,rn,· c,f th:.: ,ur :li.1,inL: m,n ,h:r to be cn:cr,·d in lh~ 
rq :i,tcr of 111c"rnkrs :1-, th,· h o !J : r of Ilic slnrc or sh:,rcs rur,h~,,cJ 
by him :inJ ~Ii ,l h,tlJ the r-urch:h~ mt1J1,y in trust for th,: re:·, ing 
tr.,n,fcr,r. ' J he: 1c,l'1!'t 0f tl,,: co:n,.111;-for ,u:h purch •. ,' nh'ncy 
sh.111 h.: a r,r,I J ,< !:.,r~c, tu th,· pur.-h.1,in~: m~mbcr a1:J :,fter 
hi, n-1rnc h.ts l,:,·n er>',.:J in th,· r,·~:i,ta of members in rurr0rtcJ 
cxerci,c of the :tio,·, ,J r,)\1,;r, the v:iliJity of the pro-.:ccJings 
sh:il not be quc·,tionc.l h;· :1ny pn;on. 
lf the com;,.1ny ,h:ill r.o t ·.,ithin tl,c one month after ccing served 
with the Tr:rn,fcr :-n ti, , find a member ready and wil!i~; to 
pur,·h:i,c· the sh:,rc (•r ~h:,rc:; and give notice :i, h,;rc;nt-,fore 
provide,! th,:; r<>pt"in,: tr.,n,fc-ror sh.tll nt any time within three' 
caknd:,r month, :,ft,:r the npir.lion of such rcrioJ of on:: mor.th 
be at libcr ty ,1il,j,·ct IP the pro\·i,ions cont:,inc,I in the folo,•. ;ng 
cl:tu,e to sel a11,I t r:11),ft:r th.: s h:irc or sh:ircs (or such of thc·m 
as h:in: r:ot k,·n Ji,r,"cd of in the mc:intimc) to nny rcrs~'n :,t 
not le s th.,n the f.1ir rri:c: st:,tcd in the Transfa Notice· or c,tirn:1tc'd 
as hcrcin),·fo1c p ru1 i,kcl, provided tll'.lt satisfactory proof of the 
bona fiJe p:i1111,·1,t of ,u:h price: i, givc,n to th~ dirccwrs. 
Notwith,L,.i.linz thi.: pro\'i:,ions of p:ir:igraph (f) hereof the 
directo1, rn:,y rdthc to r,·gi<tcr any t1~nsfcr of a sh:irc or sh:ires (a) 
v.hcrc the Cl':11p.111y h.1, a lien on such share or sh:ires (b) \'.!i~re 
it is not proYc·J to their s:itisfaction tfr1t the pro;,o;cJ trar.,~erce 
is a re~pomibk r~rsun or (c) \,here 11ic directors :ire of opinjon 
t!-": .: tr · ~~ ;-· .. ~ 
r: 1.: i:' ~ . ~:. ,' ~ : 
( h ) ·1 ; : C \ : : ; . ' : I ;1 ( , • ; " ! \ ! . : · • 
t · .1.: I!; . ; \ .· . : I . '1.' t' ; : 
in ~-·: r·.,-::.:~ '~ ~\ . . t :~ t ' . ·,_, 
h~! . 1.'f ~: . ;:\ l.: ~ ·~ . ; . ~ l 1 1: .··. 
to :h: r,::.:h · : t:.:,·,·: . · ! 1, 
prd:r~nti ,I ;1 'i• ,v ru,l. 
B. Lyle and Scott article. 
" Subject lo t ho pro\·is ions of cl. 7, cl. 8 and c l. 12 n o regi:;t cr<:'d holt!Pr 
of morp than 0 11 0 per cont tun of th o issur d ordinary s hare cap ital of thc 
company sh11!1, witho11t conscnt nf the directors, bo entiLled Lo transfer a ny 
ordinary s haro for n. nomina l consideration or b,r way of sec nrit :v, a nd no 
transfer of ordinary sharrs by s11ch a ,·harnholdor s hall take place fnr an oner-
ous considcrat il'n so long as nny other ordinary s lrn,roh o lder i;:; willi11i:(' to pur -
c hase I ho ,mm c a t a price. which ,; hall be ascertained by agrPement b utween 
th e intending transferor and tho direct ors and, failing agreement, al a pri co 
to be fixed by th e auditor o f the compa ny for the time being. Any such 
ordinary sharoho ldcr who is desiro1rn o f tran,;forrin'5 hi s ordinary share, s ha ll 
infnrm the ,-;ccwta ry in wri t ing of the number of ordin a ry s hares which ho 
d e,- ires i o transfer. and tho pri ce shal l immediate ly be fixed as a.forr•said. 
Thereaft er the SPCretary shall intimate tho same to a ll the a t.her holders o f 
ordinary shares simultaneously by written notice containing particulars of 
the intending transfer. Thereafter oach ordinary s hareholclor rece iving such 
notice shall bo entitled, within fourteen days from the date of the not ice. to 
intimate in writing to the sectetary that he offers t o purchase some or all of 
the shams menti onccl in tho intimation made to him; ntlrnrwis" ' '" ,'11·111 
not ho a party to the offer. On th e expil'y of th e foresaid fourteen clays' 
notice, the secretary s hall report the result Lot he directors who s hall di v ide 
and appropriate the s hares specified in the not ice among th e offerer., in pm -
p ort ion to the number of ordinary s hares held by them re.; pect ive ly or as near 
there to as po~sibl e. proviclcc! Urnt no offerer s ha ll h11,\·e apport ioned to liim 
a greater number of s hares than he has offer0<! to ptU'chase. If any difncult y 
shall arise ill fl pport ion ing the said s hares or any oft hem. the direct ors may 
appropriate th e s hares in , e,;pect nf which such difliculty ar ises a m ong the 
offerers in such mA nner as Lhoy think fit or otherwi se in th e ir so lo discrot ion. 
If after intimali<' n by t be secretary to the ord inary s hareho ld ers in ma nn nr 
aforesaid th e number o f s hares offered Lo be purchased by th orn sha ll be less 
than t be nurnbfl r of s hares which the int ending t ransfcror gave not ice n f hi:; 
d es ire to transfer, or if the offering ordinary shareh0lders ,hall fa il to com -
ple te their purchase nf s 11ch s hares as shall be upprnpriated to them wi thin 
one month a ft f' r thf' dat e o f such appropriation, the int ending transfornr may 
transfer the shares 1111disposf>d of to any person, whether a m ember o f t ho 
compnny or not, as he t hinks proper, prov ided that he s ha ll not t nko fo r 
tl,0m less than th e price to bo ascertained as a fure,;aid, without fi.r~t offerinc; 
them in manner foresa icl to the other ordinary shareholders at such lower 
price. " 
APPENDI X II 
S. , \ 1,-r 1, 1. 1: ~I .,f 'J\ 11,1-· .\ i , li -·r ·IJ _\" '<1 ·J,, , , ,,l ,,,, ,! i1t I i ·.: tli -,·,•of t!t ,· 
full11 \\·i11;..r ( ' Juu ..., ,· i:-. :a-t d, ;-,t it11t ,•1l : 
'l'h t· Dir1T hH:-t :-i!tall l"l' f ll."'' t ,1 r ,,rr i-:t"r tl. [l \ ' t1a n :.f,·r of B -;h .1·,· (Jf .... }U\ (', ·~ 
on o r in r, ·:0-1>- -v t v f w!t i ·h n :1y t'c.dl u·~ i1t ... t,d1 11°,•n t i-1 d u,• a !1d t111 1··!·d t\nd th·· 
rl lrec to 1"'i t1 H 1. .,· in tl 1,·ir u i ,-., ,l u t ,· d i--. •T,1ti ,.J11 r,•fu-;v t,1 n ··•i:--:,·r Utt\ tr, ~n -.. f t..·r o r· 
t ra 11srn i:......; io n of l..\ s h it.r t · <. , :· °'}i ;1, r, .. .. h, n ny p··J:-.q n 10 1,\'1 11, rn.-. t!I ··.,· d 1J- uu t a 11p1,,,.._. 
, vitho ut u .:;. : i~11 i 11 ;; ,i ny r, ·t\..--in;1 frl r bu, ·h r , ·f11..;; ~J. 
fl. rfH C cl ir,•1·t 1.. ,rs ? ll :\~\ d t..•c Jirir- l O f 1.·c:i::-.(1• 1 H !I ) t n~:: :-, f1T f>I' t o p.·rrn il lh" 
t rnns1n is., in n o f nny r-:h a 1,, t l J •'J ll ,, h id1 tfl ,, t 'n rn1 1n:1y h ,1-; n li .. ·rL 
10. {<L) S1 ·11J 1:< T t .. 11, ., pro •: i, i,.,:i~ of ~ul> ·J,,,,._ · Jf J c,f t his cl..lu~.· n o ~!t,i r, • 
shu.ll U1.· ~1J IJ o r t n ,11 -; fr•rr,·d by i\ n y rn·,nt b "" r or by t h ,} p :- r-.,J:l; \J r,·pr,· . ..: ,•nt ,\ t i \ "1• 
of any d t..'l' t 'H-:i•"' rl 1n •·1 1l iJ('r urd · ;..:; h ni l u a t i l t h ,• ri ~!t : . ..; 1>f pr,>,·rn: >ti,Jn ii ··r<• in .. 1. ft •.' r · 
conf,·1Tt·d :-: li .dl li . i \ ·t· l, ,•i"•n 1.·,h.1. •1-.t,.:- d l1u t. e,·1.·r\· :--~\I d v r t r,\: 1"' f,·r u f :sh ,\ :·, ,..; :-.h:dl 
b u subj l' , t t o th,, p m , i., i•m-; of l'l n ,1s, S h ,r,:o f. 
(b ) E \-l' l'Y n1··1 nb,) r 1JJ' n ; 3ig 11r> ,-. a .:; u for,.:si ~irl \\ h o n1·,., d ,,_'} i r ,· t ,...1 s ·II o:- t 1.) 
t ro.nt.; f1..~r nny s har ... ·~ l\·a l C\' •_ •ry p ' t:i •J JU\l r (,.' fH·,_· :S·J ll.L!. " i\·u of o ll · ··"'1'~1. :'> ·J 1n··1n ~>·.·r 
who 1no. 1· cl -~ir0 to s -·11 o,· t rnn,J', •r n ·l\· Rh ,sr,'s o f .-;i 11·h d ·:. ·,·,h : ,1 ffi imh ' r s l" '.11 
g ivu n o lico in w ri t 11 1~ (h ·rc in ,ift c r ~ca! ( ,ll ·· th 11 t rf~•t.;fi .. : r n nt ic c. ' ··, t o t it,, 
Dl1\J1..: t or.:; th . .1. t h ,• d ,';; irv:-; t o 111;~1\. ,' suc h K \! ,.1 o r tr<.1! l..,fcr . T h, t ! ,.\ 1. .f' ·r uotic:,, 
Jl tO.y iuc lut..I- , s -.,·t: n \ l :,h,\ t·, ·; n :t,l ::- h :\!I O!' ·r;.i.. t, , r. -; n. s : p,\:-a. 1.·· n ·Hl ,·, in r, .._i \, ·, t 
of c,\ ·~·h. 'l'h ) t n .Ht-; for noti ,·._--: s1i.dl n •)t b •· r, ,,·,.>ct\b lc e:..:. t\.: p t w it h t h , ~;-. :1·t i1 ,n 
of th,• D ir,·c- tc> rs. 
(c. ) Th ' t r...ln .:; f1·r 11n!i c·.-• r;h \II c·t1n;t ilt t1,1 th , D i!. ,, ·t• •• ... t!t .i._· "t : . ...; 11f t}, , 
pc r~o n g i, i t t~ ~1 wh n ,l t i,·,_· f,,r t it · ~.i.! ,• , ,f :--\ ~··/ :-:1·.~!·· ,·i ·:t :· 1:1 ·l • '! t • i 
s ep ruu. t ,· lL)t ::t t ,J Hny Ill ·itdJ.·1· ,11· 11 1 .. n:_. ·t . ..; , ,!" th , l' ' >tn; ,.\ l_,· , , .. .. : ... , :: . · , , 1 ' ol 
, : · , •• .. ; • 1 • • , , I l 1 •• r l 1· · J , , : , , : , 1 · 1 t : , •. j , , ! ... , ! 1; r. . 1 l i ... · 1 • . : , , , : • ' " • . i. : , :- .. , • 
' " !, ! " ·. ! ~ ... ; ,', , ' t tl t i 1, 1· p .. ,i ; , _' J '. \'t ,..' th ,· [ 1, 1,, ·~..; ~--r l!ntl• ,· a :,d ti ~· · 
l >. r, 1 ',,1 .. , , :· J: L il ,, • • l , ,1 '.· d ,:·:·. ; , :, ,,r f v :·: ._. .~ ·: \ 1~_:- r, • ' ! ! ; • ·1.t t l! ·r: ,\ ~ t \ J•! t•·, · 
f 11 l ,, 1! , :, n. t1 :L··, l f ,_', t, \ to I ':- ! j -4 , , 1!,: ! \, l ! t1,:, 1•.! 1 t " }.,. - 1.i •; •,,: • :T , [ },. d ;. ,• 
r1L· : . : 1 .. r· ,t ! :. . · t·• ... , '.! ,. ·.d t!i , , ,: )1 , : I ,: t !J, · ll t ,, ;· ... n: . .l r:. ; !J ,·,,·. tt t •f 
th, I! 1: : ~ . • . . ;, 'd i. ., 1: ·1 11' . q · ,· , , ,, ·. 1,,1 .. : ,\ 1< "1 · •J• it , d h_, ... ,;,·h ,, .. 11: • · f'-,, 11. ..i 
r~ ' d l ~ , ~ : • r } • ' • ' ' ' ' ', 1 \ 1 I' 1, f ",ii J. .._ Jt ,V• I 
(d , I t r; , . 11 111·, ( .. ; .. H · ;-,.(,\ I, 1·. ,.: - 111.-.. ... } ,Lll \\lt!. 1n ~ ... d a: ... t \!·;..•;- ..: • 1, ·Ji r•n c··· 
li :~, }. ···: 1 a,.:1 •I , ,: . , ,r ;{ t, : 1 ll l , ! ,~..: "' q, -.~ i, I 1h th·· c·, \ .. ,· 1:u,·. j,.• J f1 11 1t u, 
1t !• ·t1J ,, •r , ,:· J ;. 1 :~ l I 1 ! l.: .~ 1:• 11), 1 •l 1·· t ,, , 11 1 I 1 .. ,, ; : .. a. -. ,Lf, q ·, -..._ \ ;,t 1.~il l1: 1g 
f p p i1r, J. , ._~,, t li i t 1, · , ., .. 1 I, 111 1 , . n · l ,Ji d l L:i\t · ll •)t 1.· ,· t !t r , , : t 1> t li ·· 
111 ,· t: ll 1·-r ,~ .. _ .. : _::, , .. . , . ,; ,d ,. 1 11 ~·1, \ \ ~, ·.,. H .. th ,· , .. , .... . 1na:. 1,-·) lt :-- h .1. 11 t ,., 
t>- >~!n1 l l,J •1 , :l J 1, \ :, 1i 1 ·: 1 11 !' ' "' 11 11r1.· · 1 .. ,,f,4,.1 : t ,• 1v 1.\ I i, n \, Ji1 ,·h rl,-· l 't •rlll ··V!:' 
t 1:a \ · It , \ '. •· 11 11 1' · ;- 1lt,· l'1 •?il ! ··~' 1.\-.. . \1: 1a I, .. , ,f . \ , .. twi nt 1n n n 11 d t 1, i ~ d d tP ·t1 ,11 1 
iu ;, ... j .. ,'l' t tL ·r1· .. f J t . , lr1u 1- !,·1 tl1 ,· ,} 1,u ·, .... 1, , -...i c-11 p :11 ,·ft :~-... r. 
, __ _ _ - . - -L 
h~ deemed at the expiration of that period to have actually given such 




APPENDI X Ill 
TRANSFER OF SHARES 
, . ' r ...._ L J - A - ._ .I ,,... 1....., ,.. ~,I 
(a) (l) ClAUSES 24 and 25 of Table A shall not apply to the 
(ii) NO person or member shall be entitled to sell, transfer 
or otherwise dlspo11e of the beneficial interest 1n any shares if any 
member or other person whom the directors are prepared to register as a 
shareholder ls willing to acquire the same pursuant to the provisions set 
out be low . 
(b) (i) EXCEPT where the transfer ls made pursuant to Article 8 
hereof every member or trustee in bankruptcy who may desire to sell 
transfer or otherwise dispose of the beneficial interest in any shares 
and every personal representative of a deceased member who may desire to 
sell or transfer any shores of the deceased member (such persons being 
included in the expression "the proposing transferor") shall give notice 
in writing (hereinafter called "a transfer notice") to the company that 
he desires to transfer the same. Such a transfer notice shall specify 
the sum the proposing transferor considers to be the value thereof and 
shall (subject as is hereinafter in this Article provided) constitute 
the company his agent for the sale of the shares to any member or members 
of the company or other person or persons nominated by the directors at 
the sum so fixed or at the option of the purchasing member or members c:'r 
per8 on or persons nominated by the directors of the company at the fair 
valu e to be fixed in accordance with paragraph (iv) of this Article , I f 
o tr11n i1fer notice shall include' several shares it shall not operate as if 
it wn 8 n separate transfer notice in respect of each such share and the 
propouing transferor shall be under no obligation to sell or transfer 
pa rt only of the shares specified in the transfer notice , Except as pro-
vided in paragraph (v) of this Article, the transfer notice shall not be 
revocable without the sanction of the directors in writing. 
(ii) IN the event of a member, trustee in bankruptcy or personal 
representative as aforesaid selling transferring or otherwise disposing, 
of the beneficial interest in any shares or giving any mortgage charge 
or proxy or making any declaration ·of trL" ~ or being party to any trans-
action intended to result in or which could result in the beneficial 
ownership of such shares being disposed of or transferred otherwise than 
in accordance with these Articles and failing to give a transfer notice 
as provided in paragraph (i) above the directors may give to the holder 
of such shares noti~e in writin~ calling upon the holder to give a trans-
f~r notice as provided in paragraph (i) above and unless within fourteen 
days of such notice the holder shall so give a transfer notice he shall 
he deemed at the expiration of that period to have actually given such 
notice in respect of such shares specifying as the value thereof the fair 
value as fixed in accordance with paragraph (iv) of this Article and 
thereupon the directors may proceed in all respects as if such member had 
so given such a transfer notice and all references to transfer notice 
in this Article shall be read so as to include such a notional transfer 
notice. 
(lil) EXCEPT as provided in paragraph (v) of this Article if the 
comr.iny idiall within the space of two calendar months after being served 
wi lh such transfer notice find a member or members or any other person . 
or persons whom the directors,in their discretion are prepared to regis-
ter as a shareholder or shareholders, willing to purchase the shares 
{herein called "the transferee" or "the transferees") and shall give 
notice thereof to the proposing transferor he shall be bound upon pay-
ment of the price or fair value as herein provided (subject to any lien 
which the company may have under these Articles and by a deduction 
thereof) to transfer the shares to the transferee or transferees. 
(iv) IN case any difference arises between the proposing trans-
fer0r and a transferee as to the jair Yalue of the shares such fair 
vnlue shall be fixed on the application of either party by a person to 
be nominated by the President for the time being of the New Zealand 
Society of Accountants or if for any reason he refuses or is unable to 
mnkc a nomination, then to be nominated by the President of the New 
Zealand Low Society Such person when nominated and in certifying the 
sum which in his opinion is the fair value of the shares shall be con-
sidered to be acting as an expert and not as an arbitrato~, and accord-
inKlY the Arbitration Act, 1908, shall not apply, 
(v) IF the fair value fixed as aforesaid is less than the sum 
speci Cied by the propo!-ing transferor in his transfer notice as the sum 
he considers to be the value of the shares the proposing transferor shall 
be entitled, at any time before the expiration of fourteen· days after 
the date of his receiving notice of the fixing of the fair value as 
aforesaid, to revoke the transfer notice given by him. If the proposing 
transferor fails to revoke the trasnfer notice within the specified time 
then the same shall remain in full force and effect and he shall be bound 
thereby, 
(vi) IF in any case the ~roposing transferor, after becoming 
bound as aforesaid, makes default in transferring the shares the company 
may execute n transfer or transfers of the shares on behalf of the pro-
posing trnnsfcror and the company may receive the purchase money and 
shall thereupon cause the . name or names of the tran~feree or transferees 
to be entered in the register as the holder and shall hold the purchase 
money (subject to any lien in favour of the company as aforesaid) in 
I 
·" -. 
trust for Lhc proposing transferor, The directors' receipt shal
l be a 
good discharge to the transferees for the purchase price and no 
question 
sha 11 be ra lsed as to the t1 t le of the transferees to the shares
 after 
they arc registered as the holders thereof. 
(vii) SUBJECT to the provisions of these Articles and until 
otherwise determined by the company.by special resolution, the s
hares 
specified in any transfer notice gi~en to the company as aforesa
id shall 
be dealt with as follows: 
(a) The said shares shall be offered in the first instance 
to the holders of the class of shares contained in the transfer 
notice 
as nearly as may be in proportion to the number of existing shar
es in 
that class held by them respectively, and the offer shall, in ea
ch case, 
limit the time within which the same, if not accepted, will be d
eemed to 
be declined, and may at the same time contain a notification tha
t any 
such shareholder who desires an allotment of shares in excess of
 his 
proportion should, in his reply to the company, state how many e
xcess 
shares he desires to·havc. 
(b) If all such shareholders do not claim their propor-
tions the unclaimed shares shall be used for satisfying the claim
s in 
excess. 
(c) If thereafter any shares specified in a transfer 
notice and offered as aforesaid shall not have been accepted, th
e 
directors may offer such shares to any person or persons whbm th
ey are 
prepared to register as .a sharehohler or shareholders. 
(viii) IF the company shall not within the space of two calen-
dar months after being served with a transfer notice find a mem
ber or 
members or other person or persons whom the directors are prepar
ed to 
register as a shareholder or shareholders willing to purchase th
e shares 
an<l give notice in manner aforesaid, the proposing transferor sh
all at 
any time within three calendar months afterwards be at liberty t
o sell 
ariJ transfer the shares to any .person at a price not lower than 
the 
value s pee i fled in the transfer notice or the fair value fixed a
s afore-
said and the prior paragraphs of this Article shall not apply to
 such 
t rontt fer. 
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